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The of compet i tion during the acquisition of major 
'....eap::m systems i s a key ingredient to mi tigat i ng ri!Ok and 
reducing total prcgram costs . One tool the program manage r 
(Pl'l) has at his disposa l t o ensure compet i tion it; viable i s 
dual sou1:"cing. Si:1ce the 1960' s, PMs have conti:l\).out; l y 
considerf>d the advaEtages ar,d d i sadvantagf>S of dual !Oourcing 
when developing their acquisit i on strategy . 
In the l arge procurements 0 : the lale 1970 ' .'3 and 1980 's 
dual sourcing paid big d i v.1dends in reducing proqram costs 
and mit i gating risks in schedu l e and pertormance. However, 
in the past fe·,., years dua l sourc i ng as an overall program 
stra t egy has come close t c being abandoned. So l e scurce 
p r ocurement, especial l y in th e p rcduction phase of major 
weapon systems, has return e d as t h e ncrm . I t. appears t he 
cause for this can be directly traced to the large for c e 
drawdowns, reduced bCldgets and decreased quant i ty 
requ i remF'nts of the 1990 ' s . 
The Army 's Javel i n p1:"ogram, I.hicn began in the 1980's, 
deve l oped its acqu.ls i tion st.1:"ategy around the use of dual 
SOUrC.lng. Dual sou r cing I·Ji t hi n !.hit; program has focllsed 
bot.h on t he overall program l eve l (macro) and at the 
subcomponent level (micro). The lessons learned and 
techniques used in thi.s program may p rovide useful inSight 
for other PMs considering the use of dual sC1:.rc i ng , or 
"dthin cur r ent programs facing budget cuts cr prog1:"am 
do·",n[.<i z.lIlg . 
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The deve l o:,::ment o f an ac(]uisiti::m stra t egy is one of 
fi r~:t prioritles f OL the program manag e r (p~) of a nel-!ly 
for med p LO'JLam. ':':'1is s t rat egy, dl though f lexible, wi ll lay 
the foundat i on [01. the entire Ilfe cycle of the program . 
There a re numercus a l ternatives or approaches to stra t egy 
formulat i on ava i lable to the PM Hcweve r , al l of the 
opt i ons will t ake l nto consideration the e ff e ct of 
competit1on en t he pL ocur ement. 
Thc use of competit ion during the acquisit i on of ma j or 
',,-eapon systems is one o f the key ingred ients to mitigating 
risk and reducing totdl program costs. One t eol the pLog r am 
mcwager (PM) at his disposa l to ensu r e competition is 
viable 1S dual sour cing . S l nce the 1960's, PMs have 
con t i nuously considered t h e advantages and disadvantages of 
d'.1a ! sourcing when rleveloping thei r dcquis i ticn strategy . 
Tn t he l aLqe procurements of the latc 1970 's and 1980's 
dual sourcing paid big dividends in reduc1ng progr 2.m 
and mitigating r 1sks in schedule and performance . HoweveL, 
in the past f ew years dual scuLcing an overall program 
scr a te'lY has come close to being ab a ndoned . So l e source 
procu r ement, especial l y in the prod'.!ction phase of major 
we il.pon 'Systems , has re t urned t: he norm. I t appear s the 
cause :or t his can be directly t raced to the la rge force 
drawdo·""ns, r educed budgets and decreased quantity 
requir ement s o f t h e 1990's . 
The .rumy ' s Jave lin progr am, which began i n the 1980 's, 
developed its acquisition strategy based on the use o f dua l 
sOULCln'J . Dual sou.:::c i ng ""ithin prog.:::am has foc used 
bo t h 0:1 the overa l l program leve.1 (macro) and a t the 
subcomponent l evel (micro). DUill sourc ing b,s spec i :ica11y 
been used i n lhe fol l c""'illg a rea~; 0: t he pr ogram: 1) 
lechnol ogy s elec~ ion/Proo f of Principl e (POP) and fly o f f , 
2) BMD/teaming faT split producti. on , and 3) Subcontract i ng 
of crit i ca l items w· i t hin the Jo i.nt ve"ture . The lessolls 
l ear n ed and technlques used in this p r ogram may provide 
usefu l i ns ight f o r other PMs consideri n g. the use of second 
sour c l ng , or wi thi" p rograms currently fo110'.·, i ng a d ual 
,·;ou rcinq stra t e gy and facing either budget cuts or program 
dO""llsiz l ng 
B . AREA OF RESEARCH 
The area of research for this thes i s the use o[ dua l 
sourcing in the acquis i tion of t he ArIllY 's Javelin Med ium 
Anti-armor Weapo:1 System . The thesis addresses the use 8 f 
dual soutc i llg as an s t rategy tool to ['litigate 
" i sk ae d iff eIent levels in the p : og:am. 
C. 	 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Pr i mary Resear c h Question 
W;-,at \\'ere the lesScms lp.arned from thp. usc of dual 
sourcing a t dif f e rp.nt levels and stages i n the Ja velin 
p.::cgram') 
2 . Subsidiary Research Ques t ions 
a. Why is competit i on i lllpOTtant 1n aCqU1S l.t l.On 
planning il. lld strategy f ormu l ation? 
b. \~hat is dual sourcing a n d when is 
advantageous i n :na j oT. systems acqui sitions? 
How did the Jave l in prQ(jl:am o f fice incorpora t e 
dual sourcing intc i. ts acqu i si t i on 
d. How can d ua l sourciwl cont i nue to provide 
benefits for Frogram ManageTs in like Javelin which 
undergo dow'nsiz l ng and budget c u ts during program execution? 
D. SCOPE 
Th .l. s thesis is a case study of the use of dua l sourcing 
du r. i n,] various s t ages in the Auny 's Javelin program The 
s t udy analy ~ e:o the advantages and disadvantages of c.'.la l 
S01.:.rC l ng in each of stages and to '..lches on the 
appl l cation of dua l sou r c::.ng during t he program's downsizing 
dJ.r i ng the 1990'S . Th i s s t udy limited to major systems 
acquis ition as cur rently p racticed by the Depal:t:nent of 
De£ens e (ClOD) . Furthermore , th e study t ouches o n t he 
impor ta:lc e of compel.iL i on H 1 t he acquisi t ion process. 
METHODOLOGY 
':"he i nformation discussed and c.nalyzed in this study 
-;oJ? s obta ined fr om numer ous sources to include: 1) curr ent ly 
ava l lable li t er.anne , 7.) t e l ephon i c and e l e c tronic mail, 
J) persona l intervi ews ''''i Lh the program of f ice a nd persormel 
: ami l iar wi t h a c qu i s it i o n p rocedur es . The l i te ra ture search 
i nc luded t he Nav? l Pos tgr aduate School Libr ary , De fens e 
Technica l Info!ma t i on Center , De f e ns e Log i s t ics Studi es 
Informat i on Excho.nge, c.rtic l es, j ournals , pe.::iodica l s , 
system d ocumen t a tion provided by the pT:O~3 r.am o ff ice, a nd 
applicable direct i ves and instr uctiollS governing the 
acqu l s i tlon proce ss. 
BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
Th i s study serves as a basis for f uture r c s ear:ch a n d 
d iscus s i on on the Cl s e o f dual sourc i n g at di ffe r ent levels 
i n D. major deve lopmental weapon system dur ing times of 
dr a1.·.'down, r e duced budge ts and sma l l e r quantity pu r c has e s. 
This t hes is is olganized i ll '~ he fcl lo·,,- i nq manner : 
Chapter I di scussed the purpose and focus of t h e 
thes i s, i d en t i f ied the resear ch questions, and d efine s tbe 
scope of the t hesis . 
Chap :. er II presen ts a brlef backg r ou nd on the 
adva nr-a ~es of competition in Governmen t acquisiticns . 
Chapte r III discusses dual sourcing st.rategies, 
adv<':r'!tages and d i sadvantages. Furt he r more , it lays the 
groundwork for ana l yzir.g dual sourcing strategi es . 
Cha pter I V provides an overvie\-i of the Jave l i n prograD 
and the acqu i si tion SLLc. t egy fol l owed by the Program Office. 
(r,apter v is an ana IYS lS of the use cf jUdI sourc i ng 
the J ave l i n program \-iith t he intent of ident i f ying t h e 
l e ssens .l earned in =: h e follo\o;ing arRas : 1) t echno l o(lY 
se l ect i on/ Demonstration / Va l id3.tion and f l y of : 2) 
EMD/Tedmins; tor spli t production , a nd 3) SubcO rl t: rac=:ing 
the ,Jo i nt velllclLe . 
Chapter VI contains a s umrnary of t h e principa l findings 
of the r e s earch a nd recommenda t ions for fut ure research . 

COMPETITION WITHIN DOD 
INTRODUCTION 
',\'hen f orming a.n acquis it ion stra t egy, lt i s importa n t 
cO;lsideL the implications of competi t ion. Competition 
dU Li rl<J t h e acquisition of major weap::_lll systems can have a 
dLc._: iat i c e f: e c t on many different 3LedS . Acivan tages whic h 
derived f rom competit i ve procu r ement inc lude : [Re f . 
ltJ 
• Obtalning a ::'o'iler pr i ce for a product 
• Ob t a i n ing a higher qua l ity p:ociw:::t 
• Bxpanding the indust.::ial base 
• Providing more t han one SO'..lrce for p roduct i:1nova t i on 
• S t imu l a t ing resF'arch a n d deve l opment 
receptiveness 	tc the concerns cf t h e 
address criticisms 
• Obtalnlng lower =-., i f e Cycl e Cos t s ( =-" CC) 
Ear ly ident i f l cation a:1d pl a n n ing by the Progr.am 
Manager (I'M ) during the fcrmation o f the acqu i s i Uon 
strategy and p l an are the fi rst steps t o ensuI:i:lg 
ccmpetition throughout the prOCUreMF'nt p~ocess . However, 
c lo se moui tOl lng the p l an anci t h e con tracting e nvironmF'nt 
mu st be :na in~_ained to ensure t he cc-:npet i tion is not 
r e s tri c t ed 
B. COMPETITI ON DEFINED 
There aLP IlumeLous defini t jons of compet i tion. Most of 
them i nvolve words to the et fec t of "rival ry among two or 
more indepe nden t fo rces." I n a c omppti t ive ma r k e t there are 
uS'.la l ly many b uy ers and sel l ers. The interaction between 
t he two tends to lead to an e stab l ished mar ket p rice wh i ch 
is usually "fair and equitabl e" to both th e buyer and 
se l lp"I . hm..'ever , i n the defense market t here 
i s on l y o n e b uyer, 'wh i ch i s knO-wn as a mOLopsonis ti c 
s :ituat i on. Th i s . coupl ed with the fuc t t hat t he re are few 
selJers f or maj01: weapon systems and high barr iers to entry 
into the mar ket, hdS lead t o de f ense market c ompetitio:< 
be:ing conce r. n ed mainl y with obtai ning product quality, 
production capability and timely delivery at a reasonab le 
pr i ce . [Re [ . Ii : p . 5 - 21 
DOD competition is c a tegor ized i n two pri:nary ways : 
(1) des i gn competltion a nd (2) produc ticn competi t ion . 
Design competi t ion takes p l a ce [rom concept exp l OLatLm 
through t ~e E:-1D phase o f t he acquisition It 
incl udes two or more companies developing t hei r unique way 
o [ solving the requi rements a s s p ecified i n the 
s olic itat ion. Gne or more o f t hese compani es may be chosen 
t o d eve lop a prototype. The development of a prototype 
serves t hr ee purposes: (1) it prov i des a hands on working 
llIodel can be tested to ensure i t is what thp. buyeL 
',;an t ,;, (2) l t proves producib i li ty o [ the contractor's 
desi qn , and (3) pro t otypes c an he used in compe~itive 
dec i s i on mak i ng/source selection. 
Pc oduct i on com:;1ptition, much l .l ke des .lgn cOHlpet i tion , 
i ll vo l ves two or more compdnies . Ho';,'ever, in production 
the com~e r.itors o.re ""ling f or al l a portion 
of a prOc.uct.l on contract . F r odllCl~On co:npetit i on may t a ke 
p l ace d ~ ~he end of t he EMD phase fo.!: SO'.Hce selec l ion, or 
it rnay take place dur ing f ul l scale pToduction in o r der to 
br ing i n a second Produ ction c omp et.ition may a l so 
take place i n cases ",·I":.ere DeD has design speci fica t ions dnc 
solici~ing f or one or more cont ra c t ors to produce t he 
ADVANTAGES TO COMPETITI ON WITHIN DOD 
Th e Navy COr;lpe t itjQn Handbook provides an exce l len t 
in t roduct i on to competit i on dnd the competit i ve gOi'!ls within 
The t:andbook s t at e s , "The [Himilry gea l of our 
compet i tion program is to intel l icent i v a pply competi tion to 
enhance the respons i ve:less of OUL industrial Ddse i n orde r 
to obtain improved quality, a more vibrant industrial base 
dno increa :oed consc i ousness . " iRef . 10:p . 1 ] It 
str e sses trie usc of in te lligen t compe t i t ion (wheLe it makes 
good bus iness sense) i nstead of competition for competi t ion 
sake only . 
Some o f t he advanta"es of competition were i denti fied 
t he beginni.n" of t his chapter . A short disc ussion of 
each one f o llows : 
Obtaining A Lower Price Fo r A Product 
This i s the unde rly i n g p r i. nc iple o f compet i t i on as 
ident i fied i n economic ana l ys i s - ·to get the lO'..'e st p r i c e 
possible . If o n ly one company p roduces a product, tha t 
company c an s e t his own price. AS more companies enter t he 
ma r ket, price tends to be driven down unti l an e quilibr ium 
between pr i ce and q uant i ty demanded i s r eached . 
Obtaining A Higher Qual ity Product 
Not on l y does increased competi t ion dr i ve p rices dow:-J , 
i t a l so ca lJseS companies to compete in areas oth e r than 
pr ice such as qua l ity . When many produr:ers are :'.. n a market , 
"different i ation" o f product may become as importa:1t as 
pIl.ce Di ffer entiation is t he process o f separat ing a 
p roduc t fr om anot h e r product, u sua lly a compe t i tor 's, by 
point j ng out subt l e differences such as color , si7.e , cost o r 
QU~l li ty i s o ft e n the p r ime \<iay companies d iff e r e n tia te 
thei r products . [Ref. 12:p . 245] 
10 
3. Expanding the Industrial Base 
t imes o f nat iona l eme.::gencie~:; ar.d mobiljzatJOfl, 
Inuy requ1 Ie surge capabil~ty f or quick bui l d up or 
replacement of '....a::: -damaged equ i plTlen t . Fur t hermore, 
especl al l y in Ill gh .l y t ec;1nica l a T- eas it advantageous f or 
DOD to Tl'ain t ain more than o n e sourc e . c 8mpec i t i on e nsures 
the se capabi l ities are ava i lahl e . I t may requ ire DOD 
jnvo lv ement t o mainta i n compe t i tion . 
Stimulating Research and Development and Providing 
More Than One Source for Product Innovation 
WJ'1.en competi tion exists between companies, 
identl fl ed i n (2) pr i ce may be en 1 y one f actor a 
buyer considers. To ensure s uccess, companies must ma in ta i n 
th e edge over compe t i teLs. Th i s r.equires cont i nua l r eseaLch 
and development to imp rov e the product and to i nt roduce 
.innovative so l utions to e x ist i ng problems . The buyer 
ben efits from t his competit ion through new p r odLlc t s and 
produc t improvements . [Ref . 25: ;::>. J0 1J 
5. Encouraging Efficiency 
'r,'bile companies shou.ld st r ive to be e tficip.nt , 
incr ease d e f fic i ency .leads to gTeater p r ofit, not a1 ] 
c ompanies f ocus on efficlency . COll'pan i e s '.....h ic~'1 domina t e or 
a sole source lr1 a m2rke t tend , occaSl..on, to not 
opeIatp. a s effic iently as possible . COTl'pe': ition reverses 
t his tencency . Companies ,,'h o do not~ con t i nu a l l y impr 8v e 
11 
ef fi c i e n cy i n a COIllp et it i ve mA.:ket wil l be driven Oel t by 
l ower pr iced , higher qual ity prOdelct '3. [Ref . 26 : p. 427] 
Encouraging Receptiveness to the Concerns of the 
Buyer and to Address Criticisms 
Without competit i on a selle7: may lake the stance o f 
"take it or leilve it ." C:ompeti~ion, on the o ther hand, 
lends itself to opening ~ he seller up to the concer ns o f the 
buycr Each c ompany \..rant s to dev e lop its p r oduc t s t o meet 
t h e needs of t he buyer. 
Obtaining Lower Life Cycle Costs (LCC) 
Life Cycl e Costs have become an impor tant dete [IlIi na~ion 
1. n DOD source selection in t h e past t we!lty years. 

Competi t ion d ec r eases thLough rp.duced prices , 

avallabillty o f sources , lower ma i nten ance costs , allO spa res 

availilbi lity to name a ::. e ....· . [Ref. 25 ;p. 2')41 

D. DI SADVANTAGES TO COMPETITION WITHIN DOD 
COlllpeti t ioll i s not a l ways advan t ageous wi th in DOD. The 
a d v an t ilge s well A.<:', t he di s advantag e s of competition must 
be considered by the PM whc n addressing acquisi ~ ion planning 
cmd strategy form ulation . ':'he f o llow:ing i s a l ist 
inheren t d lsadvantases to c ompet i t ion whi ch must be 
conSldered: ; Ref . 16 : p . VII · ? ] 
Increased Investment Costs 
DOD III ily fa c e increased costs i n. ma i n ta i n i ng competi t ion 
through add i tiona l inves tme n t i n tooling, equi pmp.nt a nd the 
12 
admi nist r dcive burden of manag i ng more than one con tractor. 
Government ' Fu~ni ";hed Propprty mUSL also be cons i dered . 
Competition may me ,,\[, tw'ice as much wi ll ue required. 
Economies of Scale 
Maln':alning competit :i on, especia.lly du ring productio:1, 
requlr. e tr:e spl.l t t ing of cont racts bpt.·...'een two or mo r e 
contracto r s. By not bUY1:1g from one contractor, DOD ma.y not 
b e ab l e to t ake full adVi'mtage of lo'.."er unit costs, Denet i ts 
of ~ earning a nd high -r ate produc t i on which dI e inherent. ',..'ith 
large ThlS is especial l y key in major we apon 
acquis:'-tions wbere small er. quantities are usua l l y needed. 
Increase in the Procurement Administrative Lead 
Ti me (PALT) 
The t i me I,'h i ch may be required to devplop C:"Jmpe t i t ion 
coup l erl wlth r. he addi t. iona l c.dministrative requi!eme,l t S of 
·...'ork:inq I" i t h one con t. ractor v e rs'..lS more than onp can lead to 
incr eased t i me bet.ween when t he contr.act. i ng o f ficer receives 
a requirement un til a COrl ,:rac t is a·...'arded. [Ref. 25:p 119J 
COMPET ITION IN CONTRACTING ACT 
Tile Ccmpetlt i on i. n Con t:a.c Ung Act , (CICA), Pub l ic Law 
'18 369, was passerl by Cong r.ess i I: Ju ly of. 1984 . CICA, mos L 
notably , al tered tlle wa.y t he Cover:l:nent conrh.lcts 
procurEments The Fl et requi rerl t he us e of "?ull anrl Open" 
compPt~t lon. FAR part SlX detinps t ull anrl open compe t. i t i on 
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tc mea:1 trlat all respcns i ble sources are pe:::mi t t ed cc 
compete fo::: a c c n tract action. [Ref. 25 : ~. l23 J Gcve rrnnent 
agencies are requ i red to use ccmpeti tive procedures :'..n che 
~rccurenent cf g~)cds and services tc their best extent 
poss i b l e . 
The old pIOCUT.ement proced':.lles o[ formal advertising 
and ncgotiatio;ls \."ere :ep laced wi th t he procedu::: es of sealed 
biddin(j and competitive negotidtions, (now ca l led 
c.ompet i t i ve proposals) . Sealed bidding and co:npetit i vc 
proposa l s "..ere given equal fooc in'l under CICA. In ether 
words I t l S up to t h e acquisi t ien official to decide which 
method to use . c r CA does layout t hat sealed b i dd i ng . 
a l though not required, is the pr e f erred method and s hould be 
used if the fol l owing four conditions are present: 0) 
t he ::: c are adec;:uate spec i ::icaticns avai la b l e, (2) there is 
mcne thdn cnc c;:ualifled suppl i er ,....il li I19 to compete and 
per f orm the contract , (3) t herc i s sufficient time 
ava i l able, (4) price can be llsed as an adequate basis for 
detcHlining the SO'..lrce be awa.lded the contraCt . 
c r CA also identified seven exceptions ful l and open 
competition. If any of t hese seven excep t ions are 
identified in a procurement, then the pr ocurement may be 
aWdrded on a noncompetitive basis . The follo".. ing is a list 
cf the seven exceptions to co~npetition as l aid out under 
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(1 ) onlv one SCUIce is availah l e, 12) unusualOI 
c,--"npe l l l ng UIgenCY , r.c maintain OI establish t he 
indusn Lll base. (4) mandated by i nte rila t ional tr ea ty, (5) 
e xpTess l y authorized by statute. (6i purpcse or in terp.s t oE 
secur 1. ty , (7) '..'hen deemed to i n the public's 
best i:1ter es t , [Ref . 25: p. 1.25] 
CI CA est.ab i ished the LequiIemp.nt f or a compe t ition 
advocate in p.very p r ocurement shop. The compet i t i on 
advocate's so le responsibility i s to review every 
procuT.err.e n t to ensure cOIllpetitivp. procp.dures ar e used to the 
r:laxiIllum extent possible. It is the cmnpe t itio:1 2..dvocate who 
w1. 1 1 decic.e wher. heI a p r ocuIement meets o n e of tr,e seven 
exceptions 1 i sted above. 
TO eveil further competi t ion, eICi". allov.'s the agencv 
heads to exc lude lndividual sources from compe t i tive 
procedures in ordp.r to develop cr :nai nta i n un alter:tdt i v e 
source or sources oE supp l y , [Ref . 15:p . 29] T:lis 
exclusion of a dcminant sou rce o f supp l y helps encourage new 
competitors to entp.r thp. market , t hus inc r eas i. ng ::::ompp.t it ion 
en flltu.:::e contracts . 
CTCA'S ether benefits to competit i on d I e too numeLOUS 
to l ist i n t hls study . I r . .is i mport2.nt at t his point, 
hO',.ieVp[, to estab l ish thac CICA ma.ndated competition. l-linus 
the except i ons ll s t ed above, f u l l and open competition ha,:; 
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been the ncrm fo r a ll GcveLnment pLocu remen t.s since 1984. 
The manda te f or competi':ion is furth e r ou t. lined in DOD 
Di ::: ec t i ve ':>000 . 1 . "Defense systems, subsyS':ems , equ i pmen t, 
suppl ies a:1d ;3ervice::. s :lall be acquiLed a ccmpet i tive 
basis to the maximum ext e n t pract i cab l e dS a means o f 
ach-i.evl n g cost , schedule and per torlllanr:e benefi t.s ." lPe t . 
21 
F. ACQUISITION STREAMLINING 
I n t: he past several years attempts have been made to 
t LY t o shor ten the acC]u i si t i on pLccess . The Federal 
Ar:( ;. uis i tlon S t Tedml i ning Act of 1994 i s one c f the f i rst 
maJor Acts to try and accompl i sh thi s t ask. The Act. tries 
to s ho r ten the standard procurement process by mov i ng a ....ay 
f r om detailed sper:ifications (specs) in f avor o!' performance 
based specs and the requ i remen t for mi l i ta r y s t.andards in 
favor of cormne rci a l s tanda r ds . [Re f . 21 21 
The Act fcnt.l"ler eS f.abl i shes t he plocUL ement of 
commer c ia l items as t he preference . It states "To t.he 
max imum extent practicable, cont Lact requiLemen t s and marKet 
research s hould faci l i t at.e use of commeLcia l i t e: Tl s ." [Rp.f. 
1.9:p . 18 - : 9 J 
DOD 5 0 0 0 2 p rov i des (p i del i r,es in the area of 
s t rp.E..Illli n i ng a l sc . It recommends the fol l cwing a ct i ons to 
stLeCl.ml i n e t ne acq'..lJ. si t 1on p [ o~;ess : [Re f . 9 : p . 10 -C - 2 j 
IG 
G . SUMMARY 
Th is c:'1apter def ine d compe t. itlon and c;utl l ned the 
advantages-, and disadvantages I t offers acquisi tion 
C'lf ~1-c ials. These advan tages and dlsadvantages must be 
cons i dered \~hen forming a n acqu i sition s t ra t egy . The 
chap te r also identified the ner:es ~; ity and re qui remcnt for 
r:omper.i t i on within the Depar t ment o f Defense. CICA is t:--,e 
pri ma r y acquisit i on law e s tablishi:1g fu l l and ope n 
competition fo r al l Fedcr a l p ra r: urements . Seven exceptions 
to t his are a l so l ai d out i n c::tapter. Lastly, t~i s 
C!lap te r discusses n ew i nit i atives being i mplementeri to 






In order to assist Lhe PM in maiIl t aini ng o'!: creating 
c ompe tit i on, t he a cqulsltion s trategy J. S veLy l mpo ':: tant . 
The stulo t egy call :Je a t ool to c r eating compet i t i on , thus 
r;rocur i ng a quali t y system at a fa i r and ~easonah l e p Li ce. 
of t he most predcminant st rateqies lls erl 
ccmpeti t.. i on and r educe risk and l i f e cyc::'e COS t S is dua l 
sO"J I Cl ng. 
Du a l sour cing has been used '".. i th i n OC-D s i nce the 
1960 ' s . "Du '!: i:1S' the 1960 ' S a n d 1970's , t he s t rategy '...'as no t 
general l y used t o estab l ish a secon e, SOUIce dU'!: i nS' prog r am 
deve::'opment, dS it is u sed today. I nstead , t h e S t rdtegy '...·as 
typ.1.cally u sed t.o establ i sh a second sou'!:ce a[ter a weapon 
system moved i:1 t o the produc t ion phase " . [Pe E . 5 :p. 9 ] DOD 
Inst ru c t ion i dent i fi.es competitive alte r native 
SO'.lI c es as a D3nda t ory considera t ion t.o deve l op a 
compet i t i ve ellvi~cr;men t in Acquisit ion Ca t eS'ory I (ACi\T I ) 
prcgrams . [Ref. 9 : p . 5 -A - 2 j 
Th e dec i sion t o use dual sour:c i n g sboul d. be made as 
ea rl y i n prOS'Iam as poss i hle. This '.... i l l give t he PM 
t o analyze the advantages a nd disadva n tage s to each 
I '~cogn.lzecl d ua l SOULce t echnique , a n d t o c h oose the app r oacb 
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which hest fi t s the progrc:tm objectives. Ear l y 
identification of dual sourc i ng also enables the con t r. actors 
to plan accordingly, and it provides reali zat i. on t o t[1.8 
contractors that compe tit i on will be a factor . This early 
icient ificc:ttion is paramount in l ate r stages when a winni:1g 
COnlractor may be asked to assist i n the development of a 
second source. [Ref. 24 :p . 21] 
The r e are five major accepted t echniques to es tablish 
and Inc:tilltain dua l ":oclT.ces . They are: (1) Form-Fit-Funct i on 
(1"'), (2) Technica l Data Packdge (TDP) , (JJ Directed 
Licensing (DL) , (4) LCcH:!er - Fo l l ower {L/Fland (5) Competltive 
Contrac t or Teaming (CCT) _ [Ref _ 24 :p. 13] 
B. FORM-FIT-FUNCTION (Fl) 
This method duc:t l sourcing invo l ve,s t he introduc tion 
of d second product i on contTactor wi thout the need fOr 
technical trc:tns fer o[ production specifications or drawings 
between product i on sources. The second sou:::ce i s givep. 
perforrr,ance/functional spec i ficdtions and parameters such as 
overall per fO r mance, weight, size, external configuration, 
mounting requireIllenr.c; and int er f a c e r equirements. This is 
t he classic engineering concept of the "bldck box" where 
exac t i nterna l H.:ec:if i cations f er the production of the 
produc t are no t required . rRef . 24 :p. 22 J 
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there is no ~echnology transfer be t'...'een 
contracto:::s under s ~cchn iqu e, the PM mllst ensure that 
t he equi9ment scec i fica tions cHe clecH ly and complete l y 
de: i ned. These specificat i ons should i nclude: [Ref . 7 : p . 9 ­
3 ] 
~xternal dimensi ons o f the equipwent 
In t erface requirements 
P::",,·PI requirements 
F'quipment p e r f o rman c e r equire'1lents 
Lm i que from the othe r ::our .in t hat it is th e o n ly 
one which a l lO"l";5 and even to some point encourages inter na l 
c::,n:: I guration di f:: crcnces behJcen the contr actors ' designs . 
I e: mus t be ke9 t in mind tho'..lgh when consider ing this 
techn i que that log I s t ica l costs may rise d ue t o Llw 
d i ff eren ces in equipment . This strcite,lY is cons i dered 
exceptional for second sour cing subcom[lonents r equire 
l ess f.e chnica l expertise t han is requI red ::o r t he entire 
system . 




a techni cal 
and GoveTnInent 
ar e minimal. 
d ue to 
The associated disadvantages uf t his methud i nclude t he 
follO'."'ing" [Ref. 24 :p. 14J 
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C. TECHNICAL DATA PACKAGE (TDP) 
involves t hf' ut i lization of a stand -alone technical 
da t a to solic1t p r oposa l s from a l t_e r na t ive 
manufacturers. llIanufactu!:ers rr,ay or may nOt have 
origincJ - ly bf'f'n involved in the developmen t_ or ;l1oduction of 
th e sys t em [Ref . 24 :p. 14] The key to a 'rDP is that the 
1nforma t ion be comp le t e and well documented as pos:; i b l e. 
TDPs may be obt.ained through the data r ishts clause ~Ihich 
aTe out l ined 1n the federal AcquiS i tion Regulation. This 
clause outlines tile righ t s the Gover nment \dl l request when 
enqa(jed in a deve l opment program. These rights could be 
limi t ed, that is propr1etary Gr data re l ating to standard 
c ommerc i.al i t ems do not have to be furnished, o r t he r ights 
cou l d be unlimited, thc.. L is a l l data r:oncerned wi th the 
prcduc t_ ion of t he i t em must be provided . [Re:. 2:p.9 - 7 ) If 
t he TDP was not or i gilla l ly provided for under t h i s c l ause, 
the Government may not have a legal r i qllt to get the 
ccnt ra ctor ~o p!:ov i de 11: , and mdy not be able to obtain it 
Illo t ox a rea50n3.ble pr lce at least) . 
TDP is best used i n situat i ons whe-:: e t he item is of 10\,; 
to mocerdte compl exity the second source must 
) ,:rerpret the product i on plans '..' ithou': the of 1:he 
or:"g i nal deve loper. Technology t_raosfer J..S achieved 
s t_ric tly on t_ he bas )s of tJH~ TD? witn nc d l rect cootractor­
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lo-conlractoL exchanse. Th e key cri t erion .i n determining 
",-nether t o use TOP or not. is t hat the system t echnology be 
such that it ca:l. be adequa te ly presen t ed as dtawi ngs, 
specifications, parts l ists, and processe s. [Ref . 7:p 10 -1] 
The fol l owin!oJ aLe advantages to using TDP ; [Ref. 24 
There i s no need f or a cont.tact bet1;.'een the 
conLractors . 
Government t echnical expertise is 
oisad,'an t ages inc l ude the fo l l cwi ng; [llef . 24 ; p . 14 J 
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5 aeep.p tc; responsib iLi toY fer defec ts in 
the 
D . 	 DIRECTED LICENSING (DL) 
Di rected licens': ng (DL) ~s simila r to TOP i n ~ hat 
technica l transfe r of (ia r.a t. a kes place. However. i n DL t h e 
technica l d a ta are t.Tans t erred dIrectly frem the i ni ti.al 
con t rac t or (lic e nsor) t o t h e second SOUT.ce (licensee ) . The 
licensor, i n A.dd i t.Ion to the TOF, a l so provides the l lcensee 
wi th tedm :'--cd l ass i st.ance, "kllcvi -hcw", in producing the 
i t.em . In r e turn tile l i senso-r: rece ives a "Royal c_v tee" for 
ei1ch 	it em r.hat t he l icensee produces . 
ThIS approach I S often used 10 cases where the orIgina l 
SOUIc e hLls patent r ights on certain designs or precesses . 
Since a rOYGl. l ty f ee is paid f or eac h item p.Iodu ced by t~e 
second source, this approach i s usually use d on programs :or 
reasons other than ccst !: educ t i on . IRe f . lO;p. 42J r : t he 
Governmen t plans to use IlL, it is wise to negotia te th i s 
l nto the in .i tia l contract during early developmen t . DL is 
mest l y u s ed to rcopen competi t ion fer fo l low · on plod\Jcti,~m . 
The advanta g es of DL inc l ude ; [Re f . 24; p . 1 SJ 
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what 
u tl lizes un i que developer capdb i 1 i ti es , 
Dl S3.CVcmtages o f DL i n clude: [Ref , 21:p, 15] 
overall t o the Government may 
due to cmd t ec:hn ical assis t a nce 
2, The licensor may not cooperat e fully with t he 
l ic ense e . 
LEADER - FOLLOWER (L/F) 
The leader - f ollower (L/F) te c hniQue is similar t o DL i n 
that it i llvo l ves the d i rect trans:er of t e chn ica l da t a and 
ass i s t a n ce [rom one c ontractor t o another , !!owever, in the 
L/F techn i que the i nitia l cont racto r does lIot r eceive a 
ll.oyalty fee (Ref. 24:p . lsI ':" :--IP. l e ader providp.s t r aining, 
t CcIl:li cal <"ssistanc:e, material support, vendor qual i[ici'ition 
a:ld detailed manufac t ur i ng suppor L to t he fo llO\·;er. -::'he 
follower can bp. es tablished a subcontrac tor to the l e ader 
both can be prime cont r a c t ors co the GoveUlinent , [Rp.[ 
\ ' ;j 
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r he LI E' approach is best employed on i tems o f moderate 
to high comp l ex ity where two SOUT.ces aT. e needed eaT l y on in 
the p ro duct ion phas e to meet h i gh del.ivery lequ i le:nents 
This str ategy i s not .intended t.o be used i n t he acquisit J.. on 
of i r.ems '",h e r e t he t e chno l c'1Y .i s widely known and 
unde rs r ood. The FJ..R, Subpart 1 7. 4, id enti f ies t .h is 
t e c hnique as extrao r dinary and r estr i cts i t s use to the 
following: iRef. .17- 1 0 ] 
1. The 
able c c 
mee t che Gove -:: nmen t ' s 
o f the l e a der 
company. 
the 
4 The Government res e rve s the 
con t rac t s betweell the leader 
The advantages o f L/f a r e s i mila r t hose :if t.he DL. 
The illa. J or d 1sCldvant Clr,es a. re tha t no Royalty f ees a r e 
provided f or t he lea dcr. Th i s may l ead to less cnthu s ias~. 
on thc p a r t o f t he l ead e r t o pcrform. Fur t herfilo r e, t he 
procedu re prov i des lcss prop rietar y ca ta pro tect i on [or the 
l e a ce r . ~ Re r. 23:p . 2 9 ] 
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COMPETITIVE CONTRACTOR TEAMING (CCT) 
This process i nvo l ves tl,O contractors poo l i r!<J 
d u rine; the development phase to des i (Jn the acquisition. 
Each contractor may d evelop hi s own SUDSystems , hOI,ever, he 
~Iust share tha t i nformation with the other team membe T. s. 
ThlS dll': ect contractor - to-contractor exchcmge of i nformation 
Ielleves some of the burden off the prog ram o f fice . At: t.he 
completion of development, each contractor must be ab l e to 
produce t he i t em i ndependen t ly of the other contrac t or. 
In oIder fer t he CCT ap;lIoach t o be successfu l , a high 
de'Jree of concur r ency between development, t echno l ogy 
t r ansfeT and initial production must exist. Therefore the 
CCT is best empl oyed in systems acc;".lis i lions \\'here there are 
high value iter'ls with Elu l tip l e internal inte r faces , moderate 
technical and il l.arge ini t ial production r ate 
r equlLemen t . [Re f . 10:p. 411 
This teaming stTategy can be arT.anged thr ough a pr i l'le ­
subcontracto r relationship, or i t can take place 2.3 a joint 
As a j oin t venture, each company prov i des assets 
t o for m a distlrlC t entity separa t e from t he parent com;)any . 
This ent i ty {or cOElpanyl places the two contractors on e c.:ual 
t erms as partners . Each must rely on t h e other for cri t ical 
su:OsysteEls and r:c l iveries thus enhanc i ng contrac t or 
cooperat i o n. This method ha.s some clea.r advantages oveL Lhe 
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I-'Iimc-su~ccntractor relat i onship . If a joi nt venture i ~ 
rer:onme:1cied by the prog:::am office . .i t must be inr:Llded in 
, he reques t f o r proposal (RFP) . [Ref . 7:p. 13 - 5 ] 
The p1 ::n c .ipal advantages of t h i s approar:h aLe ; [Ref 
; p . 16 ] 
AU e""a"ve sour c:es are deve l oped as part of the 
9 1ven 
up. 
3. Abol i shes the r;eed for Roya l ty o r technlca l 
assistance fees 
the Indus t Ti.al base 
Th e pril1',ary d i sadvant?gcs o f [Ref . 24 : p . It ] 
1 . Increased costs durin,] t he design pr,ase since at 
l east two contrac:tOLs a l e i nvolved. 
C:ontrac t or COOLd.i nat i on and commi tmen t i s a must . 
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I t Illay vi o l a :::e anti t rust regu l ations. 
G. ANALYZING THE BENEFITS OF DUAL SOURCING 
Much has Deen wr i t :::en on whe t heL dual sourcing as em 
acquis iti oll st. rat egy indeed redu c e s l ifecyc l e c osts ami 
acquisition Li sks. A RAND study conduc ted i n 1983 
s:;:>ecifical l y addressed t he questions of the e ffect of dual 
souLc i ng on cos ts and program risks . 
Accord i ng to t h e study, cost savings from c ompeti t ion 
one usually o utwe ighed by the i nc ~ease d cos t s o f deve l o:;:>ing 
dnd ma l ntain i ng the second source . Thi s i s br ought abcut 
du e to t he decreased economies of scale , l ac k of f ul l y 
ut i li zed prcduction capacity , doub l ing of non ·T ecu r:r i:19 
costs, i ncreased amor ::: ized f i xed i n d i Lect costs over a 
broader base, a n d a decreased l earning c u r ve d ue t o sma l l eT 
product i o n quant it i es. [Ref . 3:p 112 J 
The study ri id nct rule out that cost sav i :1gs were not 
possib: e unde r some ci rcumsta nces. 1E f ac t 1t : o'..lnd that 
ou t of 1 8 i t erns p rocured ur.der a """,,inner take a ll" 
COIT,pe ti ti on t h at 17 s howed cost savings . Eoweve::::, ou t of 1C 
'0 
it: ems ,:roc:ured using a "split buy" competit i on only tlnee 
showeci signs of cost s avings. The split buys wh ich were 
S UC Cf's sful invo lve::.i simp l e items wi th sha ll ow learning 
curves a nd h i gh Gud:l t ity requirement s 
Th e report found t hat some areas of prOc.uctlon risk: 
weLe lndeed r educed . These areas i ncl uded tf'chnical, 
r:landgement, l abor, and p l ant and capitd l equipment. [Ref . 
3:p . 114 ) HoweveL, t he reduc tion genera l ly was no t a :LIa] or 
contr l but o::: to prograill 
Slnce this study was published in 1 983, thf' Department 
of De:ense has employed dual sourcing strategies 
successfu l ly on a numher of major 'lieapons acquisltion 
programs. The key t o success is an e:fec tive economic, 
technical a:1d p rogr arl ana .1YSls to detf'Lmine if dua l sourcing 
is economically j ustified OL not. 
Economic ana l ysis t ake:" p lace in tlle fo l lowing areas : 
[Re f . c; :p. 4 - 41 
Non-recurring costs . 

Single source recurring pLoductlon COS t s. 

Or i g i na l sourc e rec l1.::r i ng costs. 

Second sour ce r ecur ring costs . 

5. The etfe~~t of P'::Oduct l on ra. t e O!l un it production 
Government admi'li st r ative costs 
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Logisticctl s upper t c os t s. 
8 . The 0 : a dlSCOUil t T.dte. 
TechniCdl d llalysis ta'<:es i nto a ccoun t ene level and 
t y tJe of techn ology .l nhe rent in the sys t ems design and 
manufoct u r i n g process. "'dctors considered inc: l ude : [Re t . 
5 1 ) 
Level and type o f r e qui red tecnno1ogy. 
M""',,b, l Hy o f a l t e rnative developmen t d:-ld 
S t at u s ot the techn i ca l da t a package . 
4 techno l og i ca1 i nnova t ion in c.es ign 
ond 
plan s fOI f u t. ure development. 
Prop:::ietary di-l td . 
Lastly, t h e PM muse ctnalyze t h e e ff ect s 0:1 the p::::ogram 
itse l f . Assessmen t o f t h e below areas can p r ovi de the PM 
inSlgh t int o the correct se l ect i on of one of the technology 
transfer mettwdologies. 1'[,e areas to cons ide r cons i st o f 
f_he :ollo·...' ing : [Ret. 7 : p . 6- l J 
Pr ogram funding . 
Program deve l opmell t schedule a n d 
Ploductio:1 lead times . 
Oegree of subcontract ing . 
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Contro.cting and l ega l issues . 

Program managemerlt compl e x ity" 

H, SECOND SOURCING METHOD SELECTION MODEL (SSMSM) 
C.i'he r"A R. (Po.rt 34 Major Systems Acquisition: speclfies 
t h,~ ~ "th e PM sha l l, tllLo'J.g hou t th e ac qu is i tion process, 
1'10mor.e and SJ stain cempeti~ion b e twee n a lternd t i v e majo r 
sys t ems concep ~ s, as l ong as it is economical l y bene fic i al 
a.ld pr actical to do so" [Re f. 1 3 :p. 34'1] The ques t ion o f 
\·!h",n lt is e conomi cally beneficial o.nd pro.c t ica l to do so 
and t e acco::lp l ish compe c ition wi t hi n a pdrt l cu lar 
progr am ie, at t he hea Tt o ~ t h e Hl'S arqu i sitio:l strategy . 
Onre the PH has decided t t lat dual sourcing is a 
l egi t imate strategy c o nsidera t i on, he mus~ we i gh his 
as to wh i ch ciual sO'.lIc i ng strategy best f its t h e .l~ em to be 
procu r e d. He consider t he adv a n tages and disac.van t ages 
o f e ach s tTa tegy and t ry to f it th e best ene to his pr ogram . 
The l ast section touchec:l on iHeA S LO consider, wh i ch 
reqJires i ndepth ana l ysis, \\'hen making decis ions. 
: urthe r nar row t h e H I 's f ocus prior to a nalysis, Capta i n 
Sco' - Parry {now Ch?irman of the Defense Acq'..< is it ion 
l{egu l a t i on CouIlcil) in his ::la s ters t h e s is f rom t he Nava l 
Pc s tgr a dC: At e Scho o l t eA med w} th LCDR Be n j aml n Sel l ers to 
de velop two mode l s ~a pre -p roduct i on and po s t -produ c tion 
model) called t he Second Som:cing r.le t ~lod Selection Mode l 
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(SSMSM). These models can be llsed as a pr e liminary 
eva l uation of lhe dual sourcing opticns available. [Ref. 20: 
p . G8] ~he pre -production mode l used hy tIle PYl when h e 
deve l oping h i s overa11 acqu i sit l on stralegy i . e . during 
init ia l progra :n formulat i cn. The post - produc t ion model 
for else by the PM when considering bringing in a s econd 
source OIl a program already i n the product. i on phase. Each 
o[ :hese models take into account. 14 decision variables to 
in the evC'. l uat i on. These decision var i abl es are: 
Quantity tc bc procured. 

Durat i cn of t he pr.cduclion. 

Slope of t he learning Cllrve . 

Compl exity cf the syst.em . 

State · of·the · art . 

Other potential Government or cormnercial 

De'Jree of pr i vately funded R&D. 

8. Ccst of unique tooling/facilities . 
9 . unique Government - owned 
Contractor capaci ty . 

Maintenance concept t.o be employed . 

?rocuction l ead t ime . 

13 . AnOllrlt and t ype of subcontracting . 

COl!trac t ual complexity 
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1'1:e actual IT,odel s are presented in FIGURE 1 a:1d FIGURE 
A "." " 0 ", used to denote whetber t be t echnique 
neut r a l , o r weak in compar~son wi th the decis i on 
viuiaties An "x" i s used t o denote t hat the given 
'echnique is inapprop riate, and an "~,, is 'J.sed to denO ':.e 
that the techn i que is i d eally su i ted fo r that va ri c':bl e . 
It i s cr~t i cal t o not e t hat t hese mode ls and ratings 
ar e cnly an l ni t ia l guid e to ass i st a PM in eva l uat i ng t b e 
techn iques. Alternat i.ves wh ich may he identifjed as weak o n 
the r- Iodel cou l d be cons~dered strong i n some programs d ue to 
t he flex i b .d ir.y the PM hc::. s in ta~l Ol i ng strategies to fit 
part i c '.llar pLograms. Th e models shou l d be used as a "quick 
look" pr i or tc thorough e V0. l uat i o n u s i ng t h e techniques 
described i n t he p r ev i ous sect i on. 
It 1 S inter esting tu note tha t the f i ve QU,ll scurcing 
r- Iethodologies are listed across the of the mede l in the 
o rd e r of F', TDP, DL. LIF and CCT . "]hen ;) l aced i n tilis 
oLder, these me r.hodo l ogies rep resent t he amount c f 
ccope ra t l cn contact. needed be t\~een t he crigina l 
deve l oper arld the !:.p.ccnd SC lir ce . Per e x amp le P' :::: e qui res 
l ess contact and coopera t~cn between con!: ract.OL S than 
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FIGURE 1 SSMSM (Pre ' Production M8de l) 



























































































SSMSM ( j'lost - Production) 
[Ref. 2 J;p . 78 1 
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SUMMARY 
This c hapter bas prov i ded an i:1t r oductic:n to dual 
sour:r: i ng alld the f i ve methodolog i e s avai l ab l e fo r the Ptv' 
con sider when st ructur i ng tbe acquisition str ategy . The 
chapter al so outlined the advantages and disadvantages of 
eac h approach. To assist the ?M .in determining ~.'he t heI dua.l 
sour cing is advantageous t o his spec i f i c program , l his 
c hapter discussed t he use of econOEl ic, techn i ca l a nd prO~lram 
2.na l ys is . HC',,,e v e T, this ana l ysis may take some t i Ille to 
ac compli sh . Th e PM can us e the SSMSYl model as a quic k c ;jeck 
in identify i ng specif i c dual sourcing methodolog~es which 
are adva n c: ageous to his program . 
JAVELIN SYSTEM OVERVIEW 
BACKGROUND 
J avel i n wp.apon system is a medium - range , man 
pOLtable, imag i nq infraLed . Eire a n e. fo rge t, antltank weapon 
sys t em deslgned to replace the cur r ent DRAGON sys t em . The 
system will be capable o f defeating cu r rent a na future armo: 
I n day 0::: night engaqements out to a r equirement range of 
2, It wil l have an "additional engagemen t 
capab i l ir.y against hel l copters and b,)nkers . The system 
f eatures a top at t a ck mode :or tanks and d d i. r ect fire 
op ::: i on fer t argets that are cmder cover or in bunkers . 
rRef . 18 J -l j Tile J avelin is being developed for the Army 
and Marine Corps, and Tp.lTlains a h i gh p riority in thp. Army's 
modpr n izCl.t i o n e ff o r ts. 
,Javelin consists o f t\~O ma jor componen t s: The missile 
and t he Comrnand Launch Uni t (CLU). The missile i s an 
p.xpendable, se l f-contalned '..mit cons i sting of a s e eker, 
gU1dance system. tandem ,.,'C1.rhead and electronic fuse . 
p Lopulsion uEi t , contr ol C.ctuator system and disposable 
a....!!1ch tube . I t employs a "so ft: l aunch" feature wh i ch 
al l ows i t to be fired from p.nclosu r es or cove r ed fi ght l ng 
~os:'-t l cn 'S wi t h IIl l nimum la un c h signature . This mi nimum 
L:.unch signature reduces t he gunner's v ul:-Jerabil i ty 
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counter fire. The missile has an expected shelf l i fe of 
l eas t t en years and requires no fie lc level repa i r or 
maIntenance . since fie l d level repair and main t enance are 
not required, t he mi ssl le is o ften characte.::ized as a 
"\-looden round" It weighs approximately 35 . 3 1hs. [Re f . 
':"8:p . Cn] 
The eLO i.s a r eusable item 0: the system . It consists 
of an integral visible day telescope and a long I-iave l ength 
in f rared night sigbt wi th wide and na rrow f ie l ds of view, a 
:::ound mat i ng la tch, a bat tery box/po,,",'cr ccrmector, a test 
CO'"lnector and a hand grip/control housi ng. A monocular 
eyepiece assembl.y allows the user t o view t he CLU n i ght 
s i (;ht video, mi ssi l e seeker video, day tel e scope, and system 
statu s i nforma tion. The eLI] is used for battlefield 
surveillance, targe t · acquisi t ion, missile launch and damage 
assessment . It weighs approximate l y 14 . 2 I bs . [Re ~. 1 : p . 
The program management office, in 1986, developed the 
prog-raa! acquisition strategy with t he ohject i ve of obta i llin(; 
compet. i t.ion duri n g each phase o~ the program . Th ese phases 
cons i s t ed at ;::. Demonst r a tion/Va l i dat i on. (OEM/VAL) and fly ­
off phase, an EMD phase, and a competi t ive production phase . 
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DEMONSTRATION/VALIDATION (DEM/VAL) AND FLY -OFF 
The J i'.velin plo~;.::am began OEM/VAL i n August 1 986 wi t h a 
mon Lh pr oot -ot -princip l e {POP) and f l y -ott phase to 
eva l u il t e three t e chnology concep t s; the Lase::: Beam Fider 
Sys t em by Ford Aerospace ar.d COr;'IDun i cC!tions Corporation, t he 
Imaging InirdLed Seeker with FibP'I Opt i c Guidance by Hughes 
AirCld. Et Compa:w, and Th e lrraging I nfrared Fi r e and :orget 
seeke r by Texas InS ';:.l UIllents , Inc . Each of these cand i dates 
·....as cho'oen througt! full and open competition, and ·...'ere 
dward e d a $YJ mi l l ion firm- fixed p uce (FFPj contract to 
develop a proto type and demonstr dtc per formanee. [Ref . 18: p . 
C - I I] This demonstrated perf o r mance waG e xpected t o provide 
a key ing:::edient to overall program risk reduction. 
competition f or the EMD phase ·...'as limited t o the three POP 
CO lltractors. 
P.t the end of the POP, il. : l y -off was corducted to 
determine '.-.Ihich system wou l d best meet the user's n eeds and 
techno l ogy requirements , as \."ell offerin g the best cost, 
sch edu l e and performance ri sk . Due to budgetary constraints 
on l y one system would be chosen to cont i nue into the EMO 
phase . 
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ENG I NEERING AND MANUFACTURING DEVELOPMENT (EMD) 
Gene r al 
The EMD phase W<J.S structured to provide two qualified 
socrces f o:::: ful l rate product i on (t"R?) by r equ i Ti ng the POP 
cont !: a.ctcH chosen for EMD to se l ect a tearrunate having the 
capabili t y t o produce t h e system and perform as a 
pr l:ne contractor . [Ref. 1 8:p . C - 1 0 ] This requirement 
establlshed the strategy of competit i ve contractor teami n g 
(CCT) , I:lo!:e spec i fically joint ven t ure (JV) , i n EMD . 
The Javelln pro\jralli possessed a l l the qualities wh i ch 
were advantageous to CCT/JV . The pLoduct was a 
technolog i cal l y advanced , state - of - the-a.::l procurement that 
required l arge proriuct i on q uant i ties in a shor t period (6 
production yeaLS). It \.,,-as est.1:nated thdl the t o t a l Army 
requ i re:nen t s would be 38 , 000 missiles and 5000 CLUs . rhe 
Y;a:ine Corps estima t es we r e 12,55 0 missiles and 14 86 CLUs . 
The FMO phase was initiated in June 1989 with a cost ­
p l US-lrlCentive fee (CPIF) c ontrac t award to t h e joint 
ventu r e of Texas I nstruments (TIl/Martin M2riet t a (MM) . 
This contract also included cUi option for t wo low rate 
i nlt.ia l producl..ions (LR I P) . The ide a b ehind this 
acq-l isition strategy was that TI and MM would co -deve l op the 
rnoduc t , prove prodClct i on capabi l ity during lhe LRIPs and 
compe t e head to-head dur i ng t;"1e F::<'P for a 60/40 spl i t. This 
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\-[Ould provide the e conomical benefi':s of compet. i tier:. Cind 
risk r eductions \-!h i eh are so desired in DOD C'.cquisitiO:1s . 
'T::is '::.'<lEling arrangement ar.ll r c s ponsibl l ities are lain out 
.in FIGURE 3 . 
Responsibilities 
The acquisi. t ~ on SCLate')y ce:1 te red around placinq t.he 
responsi t.Ll ity of t he END phase :irmly on the shoulders of 
the JV. The joint verrturp would manage all subcontrac. t.i ng, 
and Government -Furnished Proper ty \'iau Tri be min imal . 
pres:,-dent for the JV Has dppointed from '1'1 d:ld a vice 
pres i dent f rom MM. 
The JV agreemen t i n cluded a technology trans fe r p lan 
('rTP) . Th i s TTP outlined the l:csponsibili t ies of each party 
with respect.s to the sharing of technological and 
manufactur i ng information. UndE"r this agreement. each parey 
agreed to provide the ot h e r nonp ropr ietary form , fj t and 
function i nformat ion suf fic i ent for a qua l i fied second 
source to producE" the 1-tE"m as wel l as t he necessary 
assistance to avoid exceSS1ve experi:nentation a.nd design 
[Ref . l fl:p . C·10 ) 
TI spec 1- f ical ly took t he respunsibili ty for the EMD 
sys~"'ms :). n tegrat .l (Jll. They also 'dere the lear. fO I the CLU , 
array pr ocessor, iIl;a,)e ciigit i za tion and correct i on, and the 
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Cr i tical Components 
iaitlal acqll.i'3~tion stra cgy lhe 
ir.deps::1dPLt qc.al.ifipc. lur i twns 
OL tr>2 c:::lticctl L~3t T:iP purposp 'If ha'l ng ?, 
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second sourcing. Thes e it ems i ncluded the l aunch tube 
assemhly (LTA) , the rate senso '": s (often ca l l ed t.he gyro) , 
ann the on · boa r d vesse l (OBV : Eac h of these i tems ",'as 
second sourced u sillg :he p ' approach . 
The missile FPA was con sidered t.he t o;:J prior i ty 
t.echnica l ris k in : he syst.em . This criticdl componenc 
or. l g i na l l y s upposed to be prov i ded by TI during EMD with a 
second sourc e to Santa l3arbaTd Resea r ch Cen te r (SERC) , a 
suhsidjary o[ Huqhes , t o be establ i shed by ::'.Rl? II . SB:<'C 
was a su bcon tractor for MM. Howeve r, TI e ncounte r.ed 
di f ficu l ties in manu ::act.uring a FPA which could meet. t he 
sens i tivity and detectivi. ty threshold r equ i rements . [Ref. 
14 ] 
Af t er contlnue d developmcn: e ff o rt s and large cos t 
growth, : :"1e d e c i sion was made to stop : unding TI . S3RC, 
base d on F' information , had a FPA which exceeded t he 
th res:"101d requirements . Th ey became the pTimary sour.c e , dnd 
provided all the EMD FPAs . S i nce the FPA s tjl l r.equ ir ed a 
second source, a sol i c i tat. i on was i ssued i n the S\lr:lIller. of 
Loral won t hat cont r act , and became the s e co n d source 
[or Lhe FPA . 
The ESAF was conside r e d the pr i ma r y risk tc produc t ion 
schedule. [Ref. ll:l:p. J- 19 ] Magnavox was the pr i mary sou! ce, 
arlO Hctoyola the s e condary. The JV ha s expe r i enced scme 
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management difficult i es ·..:i r M Magnavox , hm·/eve.:: , t hey 
contl:-me t o be a ",CULce at t his t i me , [Re f . 4 J 
Technological and Funding Problems 
The .Jave l ill pLogram experienced nume r o'.1 S t e<:: hnica l 
dl f [ l e u l ties wi. t h the pr opul sian un i t . ESAF , missi 1 e and CLU 
FPA, b a tt e r ie s a n d system weight wh i c h le<1d to e xt e ns ive 
cost oveu. uns and schedule delay s . Frem J u n e 1989 when the 
EMD cOlltract 'l;as i}'v:cuded to September of 199 1 , '1.::e".' 
tlmes the or:'-ginal c ontracto r estima t e . Fu rthe rmor e , 
2avell:1 uS with many o the r DOD programs was hi t hard by the 
redLc: ions .in mi l itary budgets and force structure c h a nges . 
These changes lead to pLO{J Lilm dmmsizing. 
Tb e t ctal p roc u rement quant ities for t h e Army viere 
Leduce::l frcm 58,0 00 to 26 , 6 0 0 missi les (54% ciecre<lse) and 
fIo:n 5 000 to 2800 CLUs (44 % dec :: ea s e) . The Mari ne Corps 
e xperienced Cl simila r reduction fr oEt 1 2.550 to 4669 mi ssiles 
(63% decrease) and frem 1 486 to 464 CLUs (69% decrease:· . 
Th i s represents a cut of more t h a n hal f the or i gina l 
quanl.lt.leS Tne 1-1ar i ne Co::::ps also pos t poned their irlitictl 
:;. r ocur ement fro:n t he secon d p roduc t i on buy ( :"ow R<lte Initial 
FrodClction I I) t o the f Oll rth buy (FRP I) . Fu r t h e rmore. d u e 
t o fll"d i ng rest.::a i ll ts, t he procur ement program 'lias stretched 
from a 6 -year pLoduction buy to 10 yea rs and u l t imately in 
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to 14 years. [Ref. J : p . 2 J FI GURE I) o u t lines t he 14 
year raseline procurement prof i le as we l l as est i mated 
prO~llam costs . 
One of the critical techno l og i ud problems was the 
overal l system weight. The operational Tequ irements 
doc ument called tor a maximum threshold we i ght of 45 lbs. 
!'.ftcr cons l derable CGst expendit'.lIe ($5 mi l l i c n at one po :i n t 
to el i mi nate this wei 9ht was classified as not 
ach ::.evabl e . [R e f. I 1J The Joint Re q u iremen t s Oversight 
Counc il redesigna t ed the Lhreshold to 49 . 5 Ibs . This 
t-nreshold change was ap;Hove d in an Acquisi t i on Dec i sion 
Memora ndum (1\CM) , dated 7 Decembcr 1990 . [Ref. 18:p . H- 1 J 
Al though st i l l Cl challenge, thi s o. l levia t e c. f urthe r cost 
g r owth. 
The FPl\. t ec hno l ogica l p r obl eDs were a l sc a ma~i Or :ac t o .:: 
in p rogr am cost "lQ'.",t h. [Ref . 14] COStS continued 
escalate as 1'1 struggled to meet t he requ irements . Fini-llly, 
u:1der guidance f r om the PMO, the JV abandoned '1' 1 as a source 
for the FP.;; and wen L to t1'.e proposed second SO'.lrce. 
These technolog ical di f ficultie s coup led '", :i.t h Lhe fo r ce 
res t ruc tu rIng d nd budge t cut s render ec t he 36 -month ElolD 
phase unachievabl e . In September of 1991, the EMD phase was 
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technical support pr,ase . [Ref. 18 :p . J -4J These chacges had 
a d:amatic e ff ect on t he 2..cquisi ~ ion strategy . 
D. FULL RATE PRODUCTI ON ( FRP) 
The pUI.pose o f lhe teami ng acquis i lion strategy was to 
alIo.,,. f or cOllCpeti tion in the FRIO phase be tween t he two team 
8embers. FollO''''ing tne two UUPs, ·where the cont raclors 
p:ove their ability to produce the ent i I. e system, th e 
production was to be compe t ed in six si:1gle · year produc t ion 
buys. The tOlal q:.Jant ity requirement a l onq with the sbo-:-t 
prod'.lCLion per. i od ..las i dea l for the teami ng arranqerrent . 
The ini t ia l plan ca l led for each team mellibe. lO p roduce 
a minimum or 10% o f t he pI.cduct i on q uanti ty durinq lm~ rat e 
i nitial prcduclion (LRIP) T and 50% du.::ing LRI? II . This 
would qualify each producer. The Ft?? qua:l t i lies wou ld t ben 
be competed on a 60/40 split whcre the winner -wou l d produce 
60% and the l oser 40% . 
Due to t he issues addrec;sed in t.he section above, the 
FRP ,:chedul e was a l so dramat i cal l y changed . It was eX Le:1ded 
from s i x yea.rs to ten, frcm l.en e l even and then [ro:n 
e leven t o fOll r leen years. This prcqram s t retch · out coupJed 
'..-Ill h the quant i ty r eductions caused uni t cos':s to skyrocket . 
fU Tthermore, t he advanta'les wh i ch the teaming arrangement 
had offered we r e l essened. [Re f . l :p. 2 J 
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COST CONTROL/ RISK REDUCTION IN EMD 
Cost control and risk reduction were c ont i nually 
00:13 ' 'ie red i n all decision areas of t;iC program. These 
c ontrols tectime even mote critical l'ilIh the t echnical 
problems and progr3r.l strategy chan'les implemen':cd dur i ng 
EMD . I n an .i;DM lssued o n July 11 , 1994 , t h e Depu t y Under 
Secretary of De[ense {Acquisition and ':'cchnolcgy) requested 
t hat the PM ir;vest i ljate cost savings measures and p res e nt a 
C:::st ?edu c t ion Plan for the p rogr3 111 . The Cos t ? educticn 
Pl all , along "vJ1Ih other cost saving measures i nitiated dur i ng 
::;:MD, is out l ined The es t imated savings of the 
ini tio.tives impl emented in EMD and FRP is $1 . 4 bi l lion. 
Th e':',e cos t savinq meas,nes d i rectly impacted the teamin'J 
str a tegy as cr i gi nally defined. 
Enhanced Producibility Programs (EPP) 
Two FFFs ,-..;ere in t roduced ( t hrough value engineering) 
during E)1D . Both ","e re rlesigned to reduce pr o d'J.c ibili ty risk 
and cost beginning wlth LR:F I. [Re: . 18 :[1 . Coll I The f irs t 
EPF , EPP I , WFle; p l anned as a para l le l ef f o r t to the E:-10 
EFP I consisted mos t ly of mi ssi l e enha:1cements at a 
o [ $24.364 mi l lion . Eight enhanr:ements 
t o the mi ss i le are lncluded in t his program . The estimated 
t otal saving of t his progrZlm are $140 mjl l ion. [Ret. 17 : p . 
5; 
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EPP TI '''E.S lr1i tialed i n May 199 4 as a direc:t resul t of 
t he request fa :: a Cost Reduction ? l an . Eleve:l cost 
reduction i lli t iatives t or the mi ssi l e and 4 for th e CLU were 
evaluaL ed . The cos t fo r E?P II is $24 . 5 mi l lion, h owever , 
the procurement sav i ngs i t will generate are es timi'l ted t o be 
n ea r $ 226 million . F'u r lhe:: IT.ore , it is expected that EPP I1 
e n hanc emen ts will reduce operations and suppor t costs as 
'....e l l. [Ref. 17 : p. 1 1] 
2 . Restructure of EMD Contract 
}\s sta t ed e ar lier , EMU costs i ncrease d by 161% i n a 
re l atively short time f rame . AS ;;oar t o f the cos t con t rol, 
the pr ogram o : fice restr uctur e d t he EMD contract to i:l c l ude 
a SO/50 cost sha:: i n g with the J V i f costs i nc::eased above a 
cer t ain threshold. Since cOS t s haring by t he con t ra ctoL 
specifical l y targets profit, t his measure was e xpe cted to 
i nce nt i v ize t h e contractor to instir.ut e their own cost 
contro l :neasures . 
':":"1e Lestruc:tur i ng a l so i ncreased t he n umbe r of LR IPs 
from two to t rnee . This t h i rd LRI ? was added by direction 
of ()SD Lo prove ploduc i bil ity of the EPP II chdr-ges along 
'ti l th proc.ucibility of a n a l ternate warhe ad . unfor tunately , 
addit i ona l UHP delayed ?RP em ex tr a. yea r. . [Ref. 1 4] 
Tn Nove:nbe r 1992, the acquisition st ralegy was r evised 
to elimi nat e the r equire:nent tor two competi tive sou r ces 
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LRJP . Previou s l y eac:h teil.m memher was to oper ate 
sepa r a te product lon lines to produce a cert3. i n pelcen t dge of 
ccmple >- e J ave l in weapon sys t ems. Hm,:ever , d ),e to tb e \l ni t 
i ncrease, t h is was cons i dered na t to be cost effective. 
: n stead, a consol ida t ed production be t ween the teClm members 
where each \~o\lld continue t o produce wh2.t they developed, 
qua l i fi ed and rnanu fact lJT ed d u r i llg El.t,D was approved . 
3. Streamlining of the Acquisition Process 
The res tr uc t uring of t he EMD contrac t alonq wi:h th e 
rev i sed LRTP strategy afforded the program of f i c e a chance 
co analyze saving meas u res t hrough t he .imp l ementation 
of acqui Sl tion streamlining . Specific<" l ly , th e P'Yl l ooked 3.t 
t re advan t ages o[ re(h, ci:lg the r equired number cf 
specifica t ions, standards , r egu laticns and contract data 
Lequirement s l ist (CDRL) in t he long l ead time items 
contract and t h e =-RIP contI3.cts . 
I n to t al , t he PM was ahl e t o re duce lhe requ ired numbe:: 
of specificctions, standa r ds and r e g'..llations from 73 i n LRIP 
I to 2 3 i n LRIP II I. ClJRLs were r educed from 63 ~ n LRI P I 
to on~ y 21 in LRIP I II. I t i s est. i mated t h<'.t these measures 
will save appr ox i rrcately $8GO thcusam:! in LRIP II al o ne . 
[Ref. 1 28 ] 
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F. COST CONTROL/RISK REDUCTION IN FRP 
Llke the cos t savings measures considered in EMD , FRP 
saving me asures wer e a l so implemented Ccs t trade of.E 
stud i e s 'were ccnducted to analyze t he acquisition stra t egy 
of comveti t ion during FRP . Other aspe cts cf cost sil'lillS]S 
·..'ere i ns tltu~ed as a resu l t o f t he Cost Reduction ?lan. 
These steps are discussed b el ew. 
Consol i dated Production 
In 1993 , the program eff ice r ecommended tha t the 
acquisi ti o n strategy be rev ised t o c ont:'-nue tbe JV :'-n t e FRP 
·...,ithout sp l it production. This r e ccmme!1dation was brol1ght 
abou t as a d i r ect resu l t o[ t he quant ity r eductions a:1d 
increased unit cost s. To maintain l i mit e d compe t i tion , OSD 
added th e s ti pu l at ion that t h re e b i ds wou l d be obtaine d : one 
from the JV, one from TI , and one from M!'-l. ["er . l:p. 34J 
2. Schedul e Reduction of FRP 
I n th e Cost Reduction p l an, t he Vrog ram o ffice analyzeci 
the effects o f reducing the procurement progral'l from 14 
yeil.1: s to 1 1 y ears. [See FIGURE 5] Thi s p l an consisted of 
s t abilizing the a nnual procu r ement q ucmtit i es and 
accelerat i mJ pr ocu r emen t i n the neA.t t e.::m, t he use o f 
mu l t i year cont ra cting, sys t em l eve l co:npe t ition. componen t 
brec:tk ou t o [ se l ecterl i;-,ems , limited competition of 
componen ts, rein'lestmenc of .::eSL.: l t a nt cost reduc cio n 
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l n i tidt i ve sdvings to elfen: an ear lieT buyou t, reasses s i ng 
trle Joint Services Opera t i onal Requ iremen ts {JSOR) and 
con t ract requirement s as wel l as the other i n itiatives 
outl i ned in section 2: o f t his chapter . 
In estdblishing t his r e duced produc tion schedule, t he 
prog ram o ff i ce assumed the following actions/event s I.... il l 
[Ref 1 :p. 5] 
Execute the program wi th dol l ars programme d i n the 
Program ObJective Memorandum (POM) ar:d extende d [OM anne x a s 
o f 20 J une 94 on a y ear t o "year basis. 
b. Congress i ona l FY95 budget plus - up of $8 2 . 91-1 is 
approved dC-ld al locdted /appo r tioned to the Javelin Program . 
Approval to use c:ontinu i ng Resol u t ion Authority for 
e ach fiscal year . 
Re investment o f y e ar to-year savings/no reductions 
to the POM/POM annex. 
Progrdm authori ty to procure i nc reased quantity of 
missil e s and CLUs res u l':ing f rom ach i eved savings on an 
annual bas is. 
f. Cost reduc tion savings wi ll be J:ealized as the 
pro<]ram proceeds . 
3. Multiyear Procurement 
;:'uTther COS t reduc tions dr e e xpe c t e d flam t he use ot 
mu l t i year p~ ocur ements . Tbe p l an i s t o llse t hree LRI?s 
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fol l owed by two multiyear contracts. p.st i mated that 
the use of multiyea r cont r il.c t s could reduce costs :-Jy a l most 
$<;00 m~ll i(m . [Ref. 1 7 :p. IJ] 
4. Component Breakout 
S<.:veral components have h e en p.aLmarked as poss i blp. 
canciidates fo:: component breakout. These i tel'ls be 
obtained by the GovernMent and provided. Government ­
Fu::nished P::ope L t y . 
5. Selected Component Competition 
AS d iscussed prev i ous l y. secolld sourc i nq o f se l ected 
CODponents a::e expec ted to reduce acquisition costs th::o ugh 
competition. 
Program Manager 's Cost Curve 
T[l.e pIogram of f i ce wished to maintain at l east t he 
th rea t competi tion even though this WClS theoretically a 
so l e SOllIce As pil.L t o f the Cost Reduc:" i cn Plan, the 
program o f fice c~eated a cost curve based cost 
estimates , Government e st i mat es a.nd po,:.p.ll t ial sav i ng frOIT. 
the cost :: e duction efforts . The purpose of t hi s curvp. was 
t o try to e : ficien':.ly inj ect t he thleat of compet i ':.ion i n t o 
a p otp.n tial sale source p::ocurement without the use o f th e 
Illni ted COIlTp.ti r ion arra:lgemellt o f obtil.inir:g bids f Lom the 
v, and :1M. The pr emi se o f this idea :..hat the mere 
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thrp-at o[ com;letition between t h e two par lies wi l l l ead to 
saving on the !)roduct ion cont'. lac t s. 
PE"r f ormance at or be l u",,' t h e PM cOS t CUTve est i ma t E" l see 
?IGURE 6] '""'ill pr ec lude system competition as well as 
component br ea kou t . However, a b reach of lhE" PlY: cost curve 
during any of the ;lroduction r uns, to i nclude LRIP II aile 
II I, ';J i l l result i n lhe in i ti2.tion and pursuit o f 
compet i t i ve contTacts tor the remaind e r of t he p r ocuremen t. 
[Eef. 17 :p. 7 ] 
G . CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Tl1is chaptE"r p resent.ee a br i ef system overview of the 
Jave l in \oJeapon s ys t em as ''''el1 as o ut lining t h e original 
acwlisi tion strategy during the di fferent phases. I t a l so 
dlscussed why and ~ow the pr ogram s t latE"gy was revised . 
:'"UL tnermore, i t disc ussed t h e '.1 sed of second sO:lrc i ng at the 
subcomponent level to reduce COSt and schedu l e . Th e cost 
reduct ion i n itia t ives esti'lbl i s hed by the program off i ce wer e 
key i ngred i E"n t s to the r evised strategy. FIGURE 7 p rovides 
,} synopsis of t he Javel i n program h is t ory . This information 
layS the f ounda t io!"l of the prog ra:n whi ch wi l l be used i" t he 
fo ll OWIng chapter . 
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ANALYSIS OF THE JAVELIN WEAPON SYSTEM PROGRAM 
A. I NTRODUCTION 
Th is chapt er a na l y ;o:es t he P11'S ar::proach and strategy 
fo -r:mll l a tion at t he p rogram and c :::itica l c omponent l evel . 
a l so (,L~ lines the options the PM faced .in rea llgn i ng t he 
dua ~ sourc i ng s tr ategy to combat the t cchnologlcal 
di!~icu l tl es , 1'orce s t r uc t u re changes and budge t cu t s. I t 
a l so l ooks at the a dvanlayes and d isadvan t a ge s o f the 
conso l idat ed appr oach, as we] l as t he use cf t he cos t curve 
to ir:.voke 'C he thr eat of comr::et i tion. 
INITIAL STRATEGY FORMULATION 
The fi r st i ss'Je \·.,hic h mus t be dddressed i s whether 
'Che progrdm strategy of dua l sourcing is valid for t his 
r.; LOcur emen t I f I t is valid, t he quest ion o f t he c o rr ect 
dua l sourci ng methodo l ogy mus t be cons i der ed . TO accoillplish 
t. h i s t ask. the SSt-:SM (pre -p roduc t i on) model i s used. 
-:ohe advan t ages o f comp e t it ion ou t l i ned i n Ch dr:: ter I I 
endo r se the need :or more than one sour c e in t his 
proc u rement ':"h1. s \,'eapon s ys tem i s t o serve as the 
Infant r y' s prima r y I.;eapon agdins t an armor e d linear . I t 
must be a q'Jali t y product c apabl e o f evo l 'llng with t he 
AS -.d t h the Dragon. once f i elded, the sys t em will 
mo s c likely be .Ln the Army's i nven tory f or many years. 
:-!aVlng more tban O!1e source , corr,petition, wil l provicie a 
h igher quality prociuct and potent i al prociuct impLovement 
w1th a lowe r life cycle cost. This advantage o f compet i tion 
was d i scussed in Chapter I I . section c, subsections twO, 
f OUL and seven . 
;.;o i th the large quant i t i es i n i t i ally projected , pr ice 
was also an issue . Hav i n,l t.wo SOULces cOillpeting aga1ns t 
each other would he l p drive prices dowll . This i s a 
tunda inenta l a d vilnLage o [ competi t ion as d i scussed i ll ChapLer 
II, sect i on C . subsec t ion one . S i nc e this weapon system 
consi.sts of an expendable round, the i ndustrial base and 
abi l i t y to qu i ckly produce la r ge quctp.t i t i es i n wdT time 
r ema i ns a key for two sources. 
\<)"i th the ini tial quanti t ies and shor t pr oduct i on 
scnedul e , t ne disadvantage of economi es o[ scale wou l d not 
s i qnj f icap.tly a Ef ect the procur ement . Each competitor "lOul d 
be able to produce a quantity large e nough to allow them to 
t3.ke advantage of l earning rates and lower unit costs 
through bulk buys. Likewise, i ncreased costs of ma i n t aining 
two contractors ""as ou t we i ghed by the adva:1tages of the 
expanded industrial base , as "'·1211 as, reduc tion :i n schedu l e 
an d tecnn i ca l risk. 
I :1 r e trospect, knowing tha t the quanLities were r e rl.uced 
and L 1e product i on extended t o 1'.1 yea::s, dual 30urf: J. ng may 
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make as :nuch ~ense . Many of r.he adv a n t.ages above become 
rlis ac:iv an~ages, and the cugument f or a sa l e source based upon 
the f ac t ors f irst nocume:1te:-: in th e RAK'D study (Chapter II I ) 
become evident. For e xample, split tir;g prod:.Jc t ion 60/40 
WIth trie reduced n umbers identif I ed wi th a 14 -yec.r 
p roduct i oll schedule would l e ad to i neff ici e nt us e of 
produ c: -::'on ca.;.)acity whi ch \'.'Ou l d l e a d to incr eased ilid i rec t 
I f t !:e program o f f I c e had expected l be possljil i ty of 
quan t i ty .:: eductions and an extended production period , t hen 
the teami ng al Langement most likely \\'ould not have been 
u sed i is entiL e l y feasible that t .he EMD conlI ac t wOClld 
have been l e t with just TI . Th e prog r <"m off i ce verified 
th i s argument std.t i ng, " I f t h e qu<" ntity r e ductions cmd 
production lncrease had been knO'..:n, we would have gone with 
T: as d sale [Ref . 14 J However, if the teaming 
i1r r angement had not been used, some o f t.he i n fl uences which 
jeopard.ized t he survi vabi l i ty of r.lw prog ram wou l d have 
surely ki lled. t he Dr:oqram . T lWDe inc l ude rr.os ~ Eo t aDly, 1" l' s 
l ack CJ :' db il i ty to p roduce a FPA which met requ 1r:ements as 
';iell as t e chnIcal e xpe rtise in ot.her areas o f fered by MM . 
r· ' ;erefore, base d on this ana l ysis, t.h i s a ut ho r supports the 
s, Lee-t ' n n of ri.udl sourc I n9 as the prima r y acquisition 
The methodel egy of CCT can quickly be analyzed DY 
using the S5MSt-1 model. This procurement initially was for i'l 
laI<je qUi'l!ltiLY procu -:: ed du r ing a short per i ed . The me t hod 
chosen dUTing POP wa s a t echnically complex, state-of - t h e ­
a c t system with no redl commeTcial applica t ion . S i nce 
technicdlly comp l ex items tend to have a steeper leaTlling 
curve, it is reasonable to expect that the lecuning curve 
f.or .Javelin would be steep . Accordirlg t o Lhe PMO, it was 
also expected that too l ing costs would be 10,",'. 
The d egree of private researc~ and development for th i s 
prod'.lct was minima l , a nd the CPIF contrClct type placed the 
majority of the risk and cos t on Lhe Government . 
Addlt iona l ly, each of t he contractors who cempeted in t he 
POP had the excess capac i ty to produce the system in -house 
with miniI:la] S'lDcontr:acting. Since the miss i le was 
considelerl a wooden round with no field leve l :naintenance 
and mi n i ma l CLU m<,.intenance , the main t enance requirement for 
this system "is minimal FIGUlf.E H outlines the SSl-ISM (pre 
prod'-lctionl model along with trw calesor .i es descrined above . 
Looking a t the model, it caIl be seen that the ca tegor ies o f 
quantiLy, other applicdt i ons, too l ing costs, maintenance 
I equiremen t , and degree of sUDcontracting are all a wash. 
That is they are posit i v e for each me thodo l ogy, so t hp.y 
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F IGURE 8 
p Iovide no dIstinction between cho~ces. Likewise the 
ca t egory of cont racto r capacity is a negat i ve (01 
cateqoLY. I t IS al s o a wash, and wil l not be conside r ed . 
According ~c the [;lodel . t he rr.cthodo l cgies o f DL and L/F 
a Te part l cula .:: ly inappropriate fer t his procu r.ement. This 
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1S due to the fact thdt the production phase was i nit i al ly 
very ShOl t . years. I n t hat alliount of time, i t is very 
difticul t to use t.hese t·wo strategies to provide a second 
By t h e time the second scurce would have hee:1 
brought on line. to i nc l ude establish i n g t. h e l ine , l e arning 
rate , solving prcducticn difficul ties , and qual:i fication. 
the procurement wou ld have been well over ha l f way complete . 
The TOP is inappropriate due t e the techn i cal 
complexity and state - of - the - ('.rt ef t he pTocuIement . These 
two factors cirive t he need felL c copera tion between the 
or i gina l sou r ce and t he second s ource . Di fficult concep t s 
Elay be hard to put: on paper in a 'way t hat a nether source can 
decipher . Furthermore . it is more ditficu lr. to discer:1 what 
requirements the PM should place on t he c:Jntractor to ensure 
t he TOP i s complete . TO? dces not provide t he l i a i son 
needed for a system ct c.his nat ur e. 
This leaves two r;-,e t h:Jdologies, F' and Both ra t e 
t he same in the areas o ~ duration and degree of pr i vate R&D. 
is par ticular ly well - s u i ted [ or thi s 
p r ocu,eIllent due to t he system's complexity and stat.e -of-the ­
'.-J :i t h a technology on the cut t ing ecige, CCT provides 
t:.he l ia ison real ly needed to tran sfer complex ideas and 
detai l s from one party t e anotheL . This, of cOllLse, is 
assuming" toe partnership is well - es t abl i shed and :informat i on 
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sha:::i n g t d<;'es place as p l anne d . ll.dditlonal l y, '''''It!"', 
contractors wor k i n'] on t he p roc uTemen t as a team, each i s 
capah le of taKi n g advaEtage o f t he assets o f t he other. 
also consolidate s the develop:nent effort t hus reduc i n g t.he 
development Using d e vel opment costs coul d be doubled 
d u e t o two sepa Tate a nd comp l ete deve l op:nent e :for ts . The 
u s e o f eeT eve r reduces che need [ or a n d c lear 
SOeC.lf lcations, "'ithout wh i c h cou l d lead Cwo veTy 
distinct products \Jnde .:: F' . Specif i cat.lons of t his 
exac tnes s ar e v er y difflcu lt t o nail down when dealing with 
leadlr19 edge t echnclogy. 
Ba sed on the i niti aJ r equir e:nents kn own in 1986 , dual 
sO'..lrcing us i nq t r,e s trategy o f at t he p rog ram leve l was 
a val i d c hoice . I t. p rov i d ed t he hest a dvant a g e s c f t h e 
avai l ab l e choice s as expla i ned above, and ensur ed 
competi tion throughout the acquis it io:1 cycle. F' , although 
no t the best c hoice , does offer an a lt p.r nacive approach . 
The program o f ficp. used a f Olln of P' tc t rans:er the 
t echnica l l n tOlmatien hetween t he t eam members. F' i s a l so 
used to secend source cr itical componen ts . Tbis is a g reat 
use o f F ' . The second sour cp. does not require the techniud 
und e r standl ng o [ t. he co:nplete system . P' o f t hese items , 
conside red po ten ::: ially ri s ky, allows [ o r consecutive 
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deve l cpment efforts . Thus, i f one effor t f ail s, thf' entire 
p~o\lram does net . 
DEM/VAL AND FLY -OFF 
The u se o f compet ition was a crit i cal compone nt o f the 
DSM/VA!.. p hase . As d.escribed be f ore , a PO? was used i n th i s 
pllasf' to enhallce design cO!lIpetit i on and demonstra t e 
peI f ormi'lnce In theory the c ompet ition and pr ove n 
per f or[f,ance should have dec r eased development r i sk i n EMD . 
Thi s is par t icularly true considering the wi nne.:: of POP 
entered a t eaming arrangf'ment for continu e d d e ve l opmer,t. 
The a nswer to ",'hether r.he POP dici accomplish th i s task is 
beyond the scope of this study. The FOP 'was a ccomp l ishe d 
w1th mi n i mal incident ; r.herefore , i t i s unclear wheth e r t he 
t e c hnical di f ficulties exp e rienced. i n t he EMO phase '...·ould 
have b een gr eater had a PO? not been conducted . 
One key point of th i s P:laSf' i s the [act that the 
p a.:: tici ;:Jdnts knew in adva ncf' t hat source se l ection a nd 
continuance in the program Lequir ed ente.::i n g a teami ll9 
arrangeme n t. This requ ir ement was l aid out i n the i nit i al 
TherefoLe , each pA. r t icipan t en '::cred OEM/VAL we l l awar e 
of this r equir ement . This prov i rled time fo r eadl 
parr.ic i panr. to evalua te t heir pr oduct 'S weA.knesses, 
choosp. a peII t n er accordingly . 
68 
Introduction: 
A joint ventu:e estab l i s hed under the confines of 
q uick_ y p roriuClnq LlIge qua n ti r.i es provides the program 
manaqer f l exIblli t y and T isk !: educ t i oll not sha r ed by any 
oth e r st :r: a t esy. Howev e r, it is a lso riangerou s fO!: a PM to 
no t be p repareri fo r d i sas t.er . This disaster happened i n t he 
Jave l i n program 
Al t hough the t echllolog y of this p r ogram -,."as star.e-o E­
t h e - aT t , the PI.J cat egor i zed t h e technical and schedule r i sk 
as loW" to :r.oc!era t e . Th i s cat egorizat ion '",'as c ue primari l y 
to the pr:oven t echno l o gy demonstra': i on duri ng POP . However, 
I-<'eight, FPA , ESAf and other p r oblell's sur f aced ear ly in EMD. 
T[l.ese t echn i ca l problems qu i ckly lead to cost e sca l ation 
winch thr ea tene d the program's exis tence . 
The who l e p r emi s e of es t ablishing the acquisi t i on as a 
JOInt venture was impeded whe n the :o r c e reduct i on and 
budget cuts f o r c ed t be r e a l ignment o f the produc t lon 
schedu l e. The pTogr am off i c e was stuck wi th an acquisi t ion 
s tra t egy not des i gn e d fur this type o f enVlrorunellt . Op tions 
we r e l i mi t ed. 
2. Joint Venture Realignmen t 
The p r ugLl.m o f fice noW" fac ed a s i t uat i on wher e, d u e to 
tile 5:]\al l e r quanti t y purchase s ove r an ex t ended per iod 
coupled ',d th rapidly inc r e as i ng deve lopment cost s , a 
cOi:\pptilive sp l i t pr od uction a n d mainte nance o f two sources 
cou l d actually i:1cr pase unit cos ts above that of a s i ngl e 
These challenges l ead to a revision of t he j o i nt 
vell t- lire oo trategy Tlnee bas ic options were available: 
cont i nue t he acqu i sit :ion as pla nnpd; maintain the j oint 
venture, h owever, cOElpete for al l or noth i ng dur :i ng 
pLoduct ion; and main t a in ,-- he ,TV thrOl:ghout production, 
Det t e r k nown conso l i dation . 
The f i r s ': op t ion of cont i nuing as planned did offer the 
adv6.ntag es o f a seccnd source for i n d us trial mobili zation , 
c o [";",peti t ion in each p r oduct i cn run a lld con t inued 
recept i veness t o the CO:1cerns of t he b uy er. However, due to 
l:i.mi t ed p roduct i on quan': ities each year, :nany of t h e 
advantages originally considered i n t hi s approach could not 
b e realized . As menticned earlier, the question of eccr:o [:"\y 
of s cale , learning CUL ve Tates and incr eased i nvestmen,: 
costs could actually inc.::ease the u n i t price of the product 
b e yond tha t o f a s i n 91e S01..:1ce. 
The second op t ion of compet i n g t he p1oduc tion as an all 
or nothing buy also present ed some prob l e ms . Or igi:1al l y the 
p l an ca l l ed f or eac h team member t o p l:oduce a minimum of 1 0% 
of the production quant i ty d ll ri r~g low ra te ini t i.a l 
prCCllct1.0n (LR I P ) I a n d 50% during LRIP 11 . This wOel l d 
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qua; i fy each p r oducer . The FRP quallt i ties would then be 
COMpeted on a 60/4 0 sp l it '..:here the wi nner ''''ou l d produce 6 0% 
a n d '. he loser 4 8%. The al l 0I nct hj nc; concept if imposed 
p rior to LRIP I could des troy t he TI/MM team drrangerren r. 
since ;-w l ther T:T !lor MM -,.:a u l d like l y continue i f at lernt a 
r(l inimum sustaining Late 0:' product:ioll was not guaran teed . 
Fu.:::rhermore, it wcu l d d:im~ n i s ll t echno l ogy trans f er between 
t h e team :neIllDe:: s and fos t.er an atmosphe re of distrus t. a n d 
non - coopcr3t ;l on Altho\lgh some technology transfer d i d take 
p l ace dur i ng EMD, c ompany deve l oped specific pOT t.ions 
of the -,.:eapon SYS Le r:1 and <p i ned exr.;er t ise i n tha t area. 
Additicma l ly, proriuct i olt l i n es anc equipment had already 
been es tablished i n each o f the plants based on EMD d u cies_ 
Moving this e quipment or e stab l ishing the l i n e :..n t.he ethe r 
plant cou l d prove cestl y_ 
If the a l l o r :-lo t h ing appr oach "ias pursu ed after !..RIP 
II, the head-ro - h e ad ccmpet i t. i on ,",'au ld l i kely be f i erce thus 
dr i ving do-,,'n t.h e unit prlce . Ho·....ever, it is unclear whe t her 
r.he savings would offset the costs a lready incur r ed in 
est. abl ishing t wo production llnes during L::<'IP _ Al so, it 
very probable that the losing t e am member would not mainta in 
the expertise , equipment and product i on space to comyete in 
the ou t yea r s Th i s cou l d mean a sa l e source t-:roc:urement 
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after the i,Ji ti ed FRP thus a l l owing the remaining team 
me~ber to increase the price . 
Opt i on th r ee maintained the JV t h "1: oughcut the entire 
procl\..:ct i. on period Althcugh th i s consolidated approach is 
cons i dered a 'ocle sou rce strategy , it does offer some 
distinct advantages. Operat i ng as a single enti t y, each 
team member can continue to funct ion as a sUDCOntractor of 
t he JV. This z. l lm\'s t he spec i alization i n t heir particu l ar 
area of expertise to continue. FurthermoI.e, as a s i nq l e 
cnti ty the JV can cont i nue to take advan t age of economi es o f 
scale, l earni:1'; curve ra t es, b2',,'er burdens and decreased 
investment costs. By hav ing onl y one ent ity to deal with, 
the oversight and SUPP0I. t -::equiLed by the PM office cue also 
reduced. only one team i s needed as opposed to cne [o r 
l-,ccorciing to numbers est i mated by t he PM 
office, these ef [ 01: ts cor r espond to reduced a cquisi tion 
costs in the area of 20 to 2S percent. 
The conso l ida t ed approz.ch provides advantages in other 
ineas also. Cost savings in lot acceptance testing are 
reiil i zed. Since there is only one source, only half the 
number of missi l e s are consumed in l ot teoo t ing . If 1': and 
produced a comple t e system, each wou l d have to be 
tes t ed to ensure acceptance. Wi t h the tw·o cOlllpa:l.ies not 
worriea as much about fut"cl.t:e competi t ion on this 
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procuremen t . melle cooperation be t vleen the two can be 
rea liz e d Advancements i n COSt reduct i on pro(;rams, value 
en,]i nee rlng. and enhanced prepl anned p r oduct i mprovemen t s 
from the "work i ng toge t her" of t he team dS one 
ent i ty. with one obJective . 
There are di sadvan tages La t his tipprodc h hOVlever. 
The ::e is no ver if i cation that each contractor. capable of 
produc i ng t he enrir e product . Although no t c r irica l righ t 
no',,', t h i s i. s a key considerdtion in time of mobil lzaticn 
Sl nce la r.ge qutinti ties cou l d be required. Further:TloTe, 
since e dc;1 contractor does not possess the estcbllshed line 
the entire weapon system, rr:o:)il i zation efforts 
c01.1 l d take some t ime wh i l e t he equ i pment dno a ssets are 
assemb l e d. 
Manag ement loya l ty is another question to be 
con sidered. Altho'..lgh members of the joint venture, 
al l eg ianc e sti ll 11€S with the paren t company . If each 
ccmpany i s not corrmitce d to t he joi nt venture, the efforts 
of t he j oint venture managers could t hwart the o~ 
t h e endeavor. Lastly , the problem of ccmpet i t ion and 
ensuring a. fair and equitable p r ).ce r. emains since th i s is a 
so l e SOULce. This consoli dated approach also manrla te s t hat 
l..h e r'MO seek approval t h r ough the pLoper cha nne l s f or a 
sour c e procureme:1c. 
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SECOND SOURCING OF CRITICAL COMPONENTS 
Five cemponents were second sourc e d in t h e J a vel in 
p r ogra:r, The i dea behind t;-, i s str a te,l), "las to reduce cost, 
schedule and perfor mance r i s k hy havi ng two sources fer 
t hese Al l f i.v e of the i t ems were s econd sourced 
using F . 
Th i s use c f ? ' f or. t hese items was critical to t h e 
sur viva l o f ~ he pTogram . Since maIlY of the capabilit i es o f 
t h is program ar e uniqu e , t he use o f F' on cr itical pi e ces 
effered t he advantage of mar Ke tplace :i n nova t:ion . Firms, 
hav i ng only per formance spe c i fications , wer e al l cwed to 
p ursue their own approach in :neet i ng t h e requir ements. 
The other approaches such as L/?, DL and TOP d i d not 
effer the same advan t age of ma r icetp lac p. innovation that p ' 
did . Tbese approach p. s p.rov i.de i nstT uc tions on bu i l din g a 
produc t which has a l r e a dy been produced and proven . Thez:e 
was not a prod :.lc t o r p.r.oven des i gn speci fi cation avai l abl e 
for these cr itica l items whic h had been pr oven t o wo r k. FJ 
provide d this acquisi.tion somethi ng tbat none o f the other 
techniqu es c o uld , ris k r e duct:'-on :'-n critical component 
deve l opmen t . 
The best p.xallipl e o[ t h e advantage second sou r cing 
played in the Javel in pregram is t hp. PPl-. . 
i de:l t i fied as th e premi e r t c c h:--,ical risk of t he system. 
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TI 's inabJ.lity t o vroduc e a fPA which cou ld rTlee~ the 
p er f orITlance spec] :' i ca tlons not on 1y caused neve 1o1.Jmen ~ cos ts 
t o s kyr or: ket :Jut also l ead to p rogra:n delays . These r is i n g 
c os ts (l llrnst lead to p:!:o g raITl cancel l ation . FOI LUncite l y for 
t he program, speCi fi ca t ions had al r eady been give n t o 
SBRC by MM in pr eparation f o :!: pr o duction , and SERC had 
developed a F?A WInch ·was ready f or t e st i ng. SERe's FPJ.  vias 
t e sted a nd fcund t o exceed a l l t h resho l ds estab l i shed f or 
t he LRIP FPA . They i n t u rn p r ov ided 0.1 1 FPA's reqGi r ed 
und e r the E:<lD contract , 
T:"1is is a fip. e examp le of a key advantage ''''hich ser:op.d 
sou rc ing can s t i ll pr ovide acqui sition pro f essiona l ,; at al l 
levels . Risk reduc~ion t brough the use of ser:onc! sou rc i ng 
c r itica l cOIT,ponents, b e g i nni:lg in the development pho.se, 
p a 1d l arge dividends f or Jave l in. When weighed wi t h t he 
op tion of p ossih l e pr o g ram cance l l ation , the p a yo ff o f 
c ar r y i n g V .... O SOUl ces fo r t hese i tems ir: mi nima l . 
The second sourcing a L jo of f. ereri a nother advant age 
erIe pr ograli' in ~ he case of the FPA , 1:1 199 1 ''''her, it was 
irien i, itiec! t hat t he EPA a driving force behind s ky 
r ocketing uni t cost S, the Defens e Acquis i tion Board issued 
an ultirnat urn that the uni t o f t h e FPA rnus ~ fa l l be low 
by LiU P I I o r the procurement '..muld be terminated. 
",h e f i r s t FPAs d e l ive:!:ed by SBRe: , ] D EMD, we r e '..'e l l over 
75 
t h i s amount. I t appearp.d that SERe would !"":ot meet t.he $12 . 5 
t housand unit goal. 
Since ,:. he sp.cond source r e quiremen t st i 11 remained for 
the FPA, because of its critical ity, a so l icitation was 
i ssued :or ano t.her producp.r using Lor al WO:1 the 
con trac t and qU l c:kly eng i neerp.d its ow" FPA. This FPA wa," 
ava l l ab l e for LRIP II. The compet i tion between SBRe and 
Lora l l ead SBRe to reducp. il s price belo"" the $12,500 
threshold 
F, PRODUCTION 
1 . Introduction 
The JV s tra t egy focused on compp.ti Lion in the 
produc tion phase, bu t t h e r e structur i ng w:1 i ch took place in 
t he El-1D phasp. left the p rogram off i ce with a " team ot one". 
The pTogram o ff i ce t urned its att ention to deve l op i ng 
opt i ons t. O create competit i on. OSO out l ined a p l a,l of 
301i" i tin9 b i ds f Tom t~"1e JV, TI and MM. However, s i nce MM 
and T I seemed ,"atis :i ed wit:, the JV arrangement, there was 2 
chaTlce of col l us:ion or l ess drastic me asures which could be 
taken by the parties to ensurp. the ,TV ::J!.ovided thp. best bid . 
The PMO kne·....· thaL a:1 in'lovat. i ve app:oach was needed to 
p.nsur e the Govp.r nment receivp.d a f ai r and p.qu i table pr ice 
from the JV. Furtherlnorp., wit~oul compe Lition , produc tion 
cost savlngs init l a t:ives needed to be z.na l Y"led. 
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Enhanced Produc ibi lity Pr ogram Sav i ngs 
Tile program o::fice inst ituted numerous steps to reduce 
pl oduc t i o n ccsts These cos t s were supposed to bave been 
contro l led bv competit i on be t ween t h e teams Ho,,,'8ver . DOW 
'.lit h t h e acquisition s t rate'lY pursu ;l ng on l y one p ~ oduction 
competitor, olher meas u res were needed . 
The enhanced p T. oducH: i b Ly studi es provided the J V 
money to i nvest i gate nct only mor c eff i cient ways t o produce 
items, b u t inSIght to possible futu r e product 
lmprovements . The generated by EPP I and EPP I I 
a l om, wi th the threshcld curve aT.e the primary evaluation 
cri t eria which the program office plans on using to 
determI ne whet her system compe t ition wi l l be pursued. 
The 0: E?Ps in this program provided reduced 
production Howeve r the use of EPPs can l e a d to ':bis 
advant a ge in any p ro'gam whethe -r: t here i s compet i tion or 
wi tho u t competi t ion [houq11 , EPPs are a 
valid cost red uc t ion measur e which the PM shou l d consider . 
3 . Cost Thresho ld Curve 
One of tbe pri.ma r y r easons t h e p r ogram off i ce 
establ i shed a dua l sou r ce acq 'cl i sit i cn sn:ategy was [0 ensure 
ccnp etiticn i n che prcciuccion pbase. Now, a:ter years o f 
banki:1g on savings i n t h e product i on phase brought about by 
compet it ion between TI and MM, they fac e d a s ituat i o n ct one 
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It appeared tha t the payoff o f ca.uying t\.;Q 
tlnough EMD may he lost. The problem was , hO\~ to 
ob tain t~e benefiLs of co:npet i tion when there are two 
cont raC Lors in a teami n,J arrangement but really only eno'..lgh 
production requirements fo r one . 
The program mana(jetnent o:fice did have Co :ew factors 
work i ng in Lheir fa vor. Firs t of a 11, the team members are 
happy with the :;V ar.::angement. Each J"1.as specifi c du ties in 
the production of the weapon system, and is com:ortable with 
Lhose duties on l y . 3y not producing t:he entire weapon 
system, each company has ava i lable production capacity t o 
en ter other markets . Second l y, t h e possib i l.ity o f 
competition , although no t ef f ective fo r t h e Goverf'.ment , 
remains a threat t o the con tr actors. If competition i s 
sOli,Jht , as discussed earlier , to be cost effecLive it wOll l d 
probably end in an a l l or nothing awa.Id and the exit of O:l.e 
of the team membe1:s fr om the market. Thus as long as the 
two r.lembe::::s view the partnersh ip as ddva:l.tageous the PHO Cdn 
use this to thelr advant age. 
The use o t the cost t hresho l d curve identified in 
FIGURE 6 is the PMO's solution to "compe Li tion wi thout 
compe t ition" This unique approach enables the Gove rnme :1t 
to mi:iHeUVer itse l f into a position of negotiat i n (J as i f 
comperiticn is i nvolved . lI.s l ong as the JV remai n s under 
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c urve estimate o f the PM, the product :'on ';.1::" 11 
con':i nu e as 3. c onsolidate d effo T. t . 
This a p proach is d i fferent Er om t he Offi ce of the 
Sc cc:et2 1': Y of ~e fense recOfFrnenctat i on of competi ng t he JV , 
and TTc,gains t one ano t he r . In t hat app::: oac~ t he PMO relie s 
oc:: ict ly on bids obta i ned fr om the cont ~cic tOIS . If t h e two 
a-::e happy with the JV a::::::angement. t hen i t is a gi.ven that 
the t~IC separ.ate bids E:::om the t eam members cue go ing to be 
greate;:: than th e JV bid . I n t his approach t h e PMO is being 
p::o a ctlve H I ensu~lng t he c o ntr act pLice lemains fa i r and 
reasonable. 
SUMMARY 
The a cqll isi tion strategy o f dua l sourc i ng to reduce 
and p r omo te competi t i o n at :,h e system l eve l o f the 
,Jave l in pr.ograill went throu gh :::adi cal changes d ue to the 
technical d iff icu l ties , force ST.rueT.u .:: e changes and budget 
It d i d however., ;JTovide sign i fjcCl.:1 t advan ::. o.ges, 
poss ibly eve:1 p Log-::am saving advantages , in t he area o f 
cr l r ica:!. eomponenLs. 
I L i s cleo.::: fr om t his chapte r th,;:.t a p r ogram's 
dcquis :i tion st:::a::.egy must be flexit: ::' e enough to survive 
"i nf l uellces. Fu.::the.::mo[e , the PMO fi1ust be 'Hill ing 
u s e ne ~1 ",nd lnnovatlve a pproaches i n o r der to successful l y 
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acr,ieve t he mis sion of p rovl.d i ng e quivlTLen t a timely and 




CONCLUS I ONS 
The IR ar e many and var i ed reasons for a PM to cons i der 
dual S011rcing as all acquisition st.::ate"y . These i nc lude but 
cue not limited to : competItion, inCr e dSec. industrial base, 
ris k reciuct i on, hi "l1er qual i ty produc ~ and possibly reduced 
Hv,.eve l , merely ,..;antin<ol to ach i eve these object i ves 
IS not leaSOI! enough to choose dual sGulcing . I: it was, 
al l programs would use tluB sl.rateqy. The PM must ana l yze 
the procuTement prcfi l e to ens,-ne tha t the bene f its wil l not 
b e out·,.... e ighec by the d i sadvantages Cllapter lI T uf f ers t wo 
upp.roaches to thi s ana l ysis. 
The Javelin PMO analyzed thc procur ement profile o[ the 
".'eapon sys t em pl i o::: to choosing the overa l l progla.m strategy 
of teamingjju i nt ven tur e, Large quantities , s~ort 
;Jloductlon p e riod and the political atmosphere l ead Lc the 
dec i s l on of dual sourc i ng. The magni t u de a t the budget cuts 
and forc e res t ructur i ng, brought abou t by t he co l lapse cf 
the Sov i e t un i on, i n t he 1990 ',,'dS \lOforseen. T:'ese events, 
along v; ic h the t echn i cal d i fficul ties experienced in the 
prcgrdm, severe l y ha:Tlpered any advantage which dua l sOluclng 
caul d o ff er . 
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In teddY'S cl i ma te ot :<ational deficits, reduced 
hudgets and an undef i ned tlueat , dual sourcing is qu i ckly 
being abandoned as an cvera l l program stralegy to reduce 
Every ?M and acqu i s it i on official this author 
intw:viev.red r esponded the same lO t he question o f whether 
dUd l sourcing Dade sense in tOday's envircnmenl. The 
Tesponse ·.~as that ,10 prog ram around possesses the quanti ty 
r e qu ireme nts to make dua l sOl.lr:cing advar:tagecus . 
This a u thor agrees thal dual sourcing at the pregram 
l eve l may not ptovide the advanlage o f COSl savi.ngs in 
today's envi r or.ment. Hov.'ever , tr.e purpose of dual sourci.ng 
does nol ah,'ays li e in cost savings . Ri sk reduct i on is also 
a key advantage of dual sourc i ng , and t hi s advan tage j s 
still very much actlievab l e . 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 

Prima r y Research Question 

\\1hat V.'ere the l esson s learned f rom the use of dua l 
sourcing at di f ferent levels and stages ia the Javelin 
program? 
The PM of t he Javelin program learned tha t an effec t ive 
acquisition stLaleqy i s one which is fiLst and foremos t 
flexible . Over the l i fe of an acquis .i. tion, deve l opIllents i n 
the environ:nent can have a tr emendous effec t on pLogr.arn 
Tequlrements . Large q'..lantity requiLements in t he beg inn i ng 
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can cha:1ge to sma] ler ones as the t hreat and budgetary 
constr3.lneS change. An acquisiti on s t rCl.tegy I-ih i ch cannot 
evo l ve these changes seve-:: e l y I l mits the PM's 
d .!. terna t ives and can lead t o prograIll fa i lure . 
I f dual sourc ~ng is chosen ae; t he overall S t rd t egy, 
bui l d i n alt.ernatives for a sole source J)rocurement. 
Altho .J2velin planned on compe t i t ion to mi tiga te coses 
our::.:<g production phase, quan t i ty requirements did no t 
a llO',,- fo r two separate sources . The J ave l in i'M had to seek 
otheT ways t o meet cost goa l s . Th e cos t t hresho l d curve 
appears t o provide t he t hreat of cOillpetition which t he PM 
....·anted. This innovative app r oach in inser t ing a f a cet o[ 
cO:Tlp et". i tion :'..nto a sole source ar r angement may prov i de other 
PMS <in oppor t uni ::y to Let.hi nk their teaming strategy in 
produce i on. Quantity r equ i.r emen ts are not the only thing 
that can leave a PM o f a dua l sour cing illethod with o:-Jly one 
The ?M for MT LSTAR round himsel f in the same 
situa tion when olle of the sources ·,,'as unable to IT,eet EMD 
rp.q'.llrements . flex ibi l i~y dnd innovation 3.rp. impeLa t i ve 
v.'hen using a d ual sGur cing strategy. 
The bene fi t wh ir:h dual sourc i ng played at the cri~iccil 
i tem l eve.1 i s unmeasllr abl e. The avallabil l ty o[ SERe's FPA 
dULing EMD literally saved the Javel in rn:ograffi f rom 
CCinc ellat i on . The ava,i labl li ty of a source f or :'..tems 
"I.'lich are cri t ical to a progr am's success reduces both 
schedule aTld I.echnica l risk. Furthermore, at the COmpOI!ent 
l evel, q ua n t ities may sti l l be g r eat enough to provide a 
cost advantage . ~ven i f cost reciuct ions are not achievable 
fo r these items, I.he PM shoulci r:ons i der I.he trade off of cost 
for r i sk reduction. Trle benef i ts may outweigh the costs. 
A key I p.sson l ea Tned from the of t.. he j oint ventu r e 
st r atp.(;y ii t the p r ogram l eve l was tha r. the use of a joint 
ven t ure may prov i de advanta' jes witho:.Jt seeking co:npetition 
in the pToduction phase . The p r imary leason fOl the use of 
d'.1al SOLl r c i mr at the plogra:n .level i n the 19BQ s was to 
develop a ser:ond sourcp. f or compet i tiol! i n tf1.e Dror:uc tion 
phase. Many PMs s t i 1 1 cons i der this as the dec ir: i n g f actor 
on ',.,.hether dual sO:.Jrcing mak e s sense dS a p rogrdm strc t p.'lY . 
rhe stratp.gy of t eami ng/joint venture provi.ded t he JaveLin 
proq r am something that al t hough expe cted, not consider e d t h e 
prime .:.ea son t o see k c joint venture. This added featur e 
WeS two independent e :l.tities, cdch with thei r own t echnica l 
expertise, wo-:: ki ng togethe r to solve state · o f · the · art 
tcchnicd l prob l ems. Each t eam member has their OW!" resea r ch 
and developme :l.t assets, particular areas of kn o\" ho .....' and 
ydst products which when comb i ned as a team can s olve issues 
in OJ. rr.or e efficie nt manner than one .....'orki!"lg a l one . 
Subsidiary Research Questions 
T,\'hy is competition importanr. in acqu i sition 
planning dna st r dtegy fOIllll;. l a t ion? 
c:'IUS question lS answe.:::ed i n cna ,:J ter I I, Sect i on C and 
It i s impor t ant to pl a n [or c ompetit .lon up !' ront 
early on . No t o nly i s co:npetition mand o.r.ed in l aw, but t he 
PM mus t conside r i ts advantages and d i sadvantages progr.am 
\\Trlat is Qua l sou r cing a n d whell is its use 
a dvanta,jeous in ma jor sys t ems acq'..l i sit i o ns ? 
Dua l sou.::ci ng, as '..'e ll as t h e f i ve t e c hniques , is 
o u tlined in Chap te r I I I c:'he advantages, d isadvantages and 
p roper u ses of eacrl me t hodo logy are e xp l a i ned . A PM mu s t 
e x amine t hese advantages t o decide whether dua l sourc i ng i s 
advant,,,geou s to his particu1cn program . There are numerous 
:ne t llods avai l able to do t his. Chapter II I b r i e f l y e xplains 
two o f t h ese met hod s . 
How d i d t he Jave lin program of fi ce i ncor porate 
dUdl sourcing into it s acquis i tion strategy? 
Th e PM u sed dua l SO'.l rc ing [\'.'0 [lLLmaIy ways. Firs t. 
at al l , t he overal l ac q u i sit l on strategy was set '..lP a lol1g 
t: h e team i ng/ j o l n t ventllre arranqement '':'h i s approach 
begin l a Le r than t he EV,O p hase so that the team c o u l d 
develop the product toge the r and enter production with equal 
abil ity . 
Second l y, the PM established second sources o f critical 
componen t s. The :nethc)d c:tw,"en was Form, Fit, Function . 
In :J. t:J.a l l y onl y two item,: ....:ere identified as critical, but as 
the program p rog ressed o t her item": we.re added to the list. 
'::"his us e of dua l sourcing a t betII trw primary and secondary 
level wa.s key to the overall success of the program . 
d. How can dua l sourcing continue to prov i de 
bene f its :'o r Program Managers in programs like Jave l i n which 
unae r go dO\".'ns i zing and budget cuts dULing p:OSjram execution"; 
As explained above, cual sourc i ng can have a tre:Tlendous 
impact at the c.ritical cOl'lponent level. All acquisition 
officials intervie·,.:ed by t:-tis author aqreed that a second 
source for cr i t i cal COlrponents can st i1 1 provide exce l l ent 
advant ages in toda.y's environment. PMs should consider 
these items for second sourcing to reduce cost, techn l cal, 
and schedu l e risk . 
Dual sourcing, specifica l ly teaming, is no t use less at 
the program level although l'lany believe this is true . 
Tea:ninq may not make sense i n touay 's environment o f small 
quaCltity requ::'rements s i nce spli tting production woula lead 
to i ncreased procurement costs . However , teamin9 offers 
a nother advantage if mainta i neri as a sa l e SOUTce t h r.ough 
procurement. I t Foo l s the expertise of part i es in different 
Aleas \-"here a broad base of technical exper t ise is requir ed . 
By poo l Ing t he f' xpe l': t i se of: diffe r f'nt companies deve l opment 
time and ccst~ ooy be reduced . Addi tional ly, teamIng may bf' 
used where two companies have ccmplf':nentdr y existing 
commPLcia l ly developed products . Combining t h e two products 
minima l addi tiona 1 deve lop:nen L may provide the 
GOVP .lnmen t with ti nep.ded product quickly, and cheapl y . 
Tedmi nq is particLllar l y advantageou s ',,'hen dealing with 
state ' of- t he -ar t plOCUlernfmIS wherp. interoperabili t y is an 
Diyitizdtion and the Force XXI ar e a pr i me p.x amp l e , 
reaming i s being used in the digitization effort to 
incorpora t e the expeL t isf' of spvpr d l producALs . 
D'.la l sou rC 1. ng is not dead . It i s s ti 11 a viablp opt ion 
for Pb-ls ~c considpr. Hcwevpr, the rationale bphind its us e 
in th e 19903 has f'volvAd dup to budgAtd ry and quanti ty 
requiremf'nts. Thf' fut UIP th i s strategy cpt. ion l i es in 
i ts abil i ty to providA risk mit igation for critical 
compon ents, and an aqu i sitlon mu l t iplier at the pro<]ram 
lAve l by ccnsol ldatillg contractor 's spec:'.. f ic exper~isp t o 
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